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On November 20, 2014, President Obama, frustrated by congressional
inaction on immigration, announced an ambitious and potentially
transformative prosecutorial discretion policy to forestall the deportations of
millions of undocumented immigrants. The announcement immediately sparked
legal challenges, which quickly wound their way to the Supreme Court, as well
as a nationwide debate about the limits of the President's prosecutorial
discretion authority. President Obama 's actions are part of a larger trend
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whereby modern presidents have increasingly used robust assertions of
prosecutorial discretion powers to achieve policy goals that they could not
realize through legislation.
There are clear dangers in allowing a president to wield excessive
prosecutorial discretion power. Taken to an extreme, in the context of the vast
modern administrative state, a president could significantly undermine the will
of Congress across a wide array of subject areas and thereby upset the
separation ofpowers enshrined in the Constitution. This legitimate concern has
led some to argue that a president should not be permitted to exercise
prosecutorial discretion categorically or based on her own normative view of
the public interest. Categorical normative prosecutorial discretion policies pose
the greatest risk of i'?fringing on Congress's primary policy-making role;
however, excising agency-wide policies and normative judgments is entirely
unworkable. The core purposes ofprosecutorial discretion-justice, mercy, and
societal utility-all necessarily require the President to make independent
judgments about the wisdom ofprosecution. Limiting prosecutorial discretion
to case-by-case determinations would be at odds with historic and modern
practice and would significantly undermine the institutional design goals of
transparency, uniformity, and accountability.
This Article suggests a new way to think about the boundaries of the
President's prosecutorial discretion authority. Specifically, I propose that the
nature of prosecutorial discretion power is dependent on the context of
eriforcement, and that the power is at its zenith when a president exercises her
discretion to protect physical liberty. It is in the liberty deprivation context
where historical precedent, the Constitution's structural bias against liberty
deprivation, and the textual sources of prosecutorial discretion powers all
militate in favor of robust presidential powers as a necessary check against
excessively punitive statutory schemes.
INTRODUCTION

Prosecutorial discretion refers to the power of the Executive to determine
how, when, and whether to initiate and pursue enforcement proceedings. 1
Prosecutorial discretion is most commonly conceived of in the criminal context,
wherein prosecutors routinely make determinations about which cases to bring,
how vigorously to pursue them, and if and when to abandon a prosecution.
However, in the modem era, prosecutorial discretion authority has been applied
to a vast array of federal administrative enforcement proceedings beyond the
criminal context. Modem presidents have asserted increasingly robust visions of
1

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, U.S.
ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-27.001 (1997) (discussing the appropriate role of prosecutorial
discretion); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION GUIDELINES (2000) (same); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role ofProsecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243,244 (2010) (same). The precise
boundaries of prosecutorial discretion are discussed infra at notes 21-23, 258-260 and
accompanying text.

"
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the scope of their own prosecutorial discretion power-at times using
prosecutorial discretion policies to achieve goals that they could not otherwise
realize through the legislative process.
The most prominent recent example is President Obama's programs to forego
deportation proceedings against certain undocumented immigrants who came to
the United States as children, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
("DACA"), or who are parents of U.S. citizens or permanent residents, Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans ("DAPA"). 2 These programs were instituted in
direct response to Congress's failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform
and the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors ("DREAM")
Act. 3 Both DACA and DAPA have been the focus of intense litigation, and the
latter program is currently the subject of a preliminary injunction.4
But immigration is only the latest arena for bold assertions of prosecutorial
discretion authority. President George W. Bush, for example, asserted his
prosecutorial discretion authority to decline to initiate enforcement actions under
the Clean Air Act against a category of coal-fired electrical plants even after the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had struck down a regulation protecting
precisely the same category ofplants. 5 President Bush also put in place similar
robust nonenforcement policies regarding civil rights, antitrust, labor, and
securities enforcement, to name. a few. 6
These aggressive assertions of presidentiaF nonenforcement power raise a
serious constitutional question: What limiting principle on prosecutorial

2

Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enft, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm'r of U.S. Customs & Border
Prot.
(Nov.
20,
2014)
[hereinafter
DAPA
Memorandum],
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_ 1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6V58-LMTB]; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.,
Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enft (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter DACA Memorandum],
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s 1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-whocame-to-us-as-children. pdf [https://perma.cc/D8LN-JCJH].
3
Elahe Izadi, The Strategy to Hold Off on Deportation Changes Wins Out, NAT'L J. (May
28, 2014) (noting that President Obama initially delayed this action to give Congress a chance
to pass an immigration bill).
4
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholcling the preliminary
injunction upon a determination that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of the
claim that the President's order violated the Administrative Procedure Act), ajf'd mem., 136
S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
5 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574,577 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
6 See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
7
I use the terms "President" and "Executive" interchangeably throughout this Article to
refer to the branch of government that wields the power conferred by Article II of the
Constitution. I take no position herein on the robust debate regarding the precise boundaries
of the President's control over agency actions. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
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discretion authority is necessary to preserve the separation of powers enshrined
in our Constitution? Put another way: At what point does a nonenforcement
policy cross the line between the executive discretion properly vested in the
President and instead become violative of the President's constitutional duty to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed"? 8 Taken to its extreme, the power
not to enforce could act as a constitutionally suspect second veto for a broad
swath of legislation. It would be odd indeed for the Framers to have constructed
a mechanism for overriding presidential vetoes only to have such mechanism
rendered meaningless by a president's unchecked power to refuse to enforce
laws based solely on divergent views about a law's political wisdom.
With the well-documented escalating reach of federal criminal law,9 and the
enormous breadth of civil regulatory schemes embodied in modem federal
legislation, 10 there is hardly a person or business in the United States that could
not theoretically become subject to a federal enforcement action of one kind or
another. The breadth of regulated conduct coupled with the reality of limited
enforcement resources necessarily means that prosecutorial discretion is a
central feature of modem federal law enforcement. In the immigration context,
for example, there are estimated to be eleven million undocumented individuals
potentially subject to deportation proceedings in the United States. 11 However,
notwithstanding a historically unprecedented national investment in
immigration enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security has explained
the annual enforcement budget can support a maximum of 400,000 deportations
per year. 12 The same story of vast regulatory schemes and limited enforcement
resources can be told about nearly every federal enforcement system. Thus,
resource constraints alone are a substantial justification for prosecutorial
discretion. But the issue becomes more difficult when prosecutorial discretion
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 594-96 (1994)
(arguing for a robust version of presidential control over agency actions), with Robert V.
Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary
Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 966 (2001) (arguing that the President lacks the authority to
dictate substantive decisions entrusted to agencies by law).
8
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
9
See Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962).
IO See generally RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE, FROM LIBERTY TO DEMOCRACY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 210-49 (2002).
11
Memorandum Opinion from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.
(Nov.
19,
2014)
[hereinafter
OLC
Opinion],
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7U4-KW2Q] (detailing the constitutional and
statutory bases for presidential discretion in immigration enforcement).
12
Id.; see also DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 2-3 (2013)
(documenting that the U.S. government spends more on federal immigration enforcement than
on all other principal federal criminal law enforcement agencies combined, with nearly $18
billion spent in fiscal year 2012).
·
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policies are driven less by resource constraints and more by a President's
normative judgment regarding the public interest, or lack thereof, in
enforcement.
The Supreme Court has yet to provide significant guidance on the
constitutional limits of executive discretion in this context. In United States v.
Texas 13-the litigation challenging President Obama's DAPA program-the
Court recently had the opportunity to offer such guidance. Instead, with one seat
on the Court unfilled, it deadlocked 4-4, leaving in place the preliminary
injunction issued by the lower courts with a one-sentence-decision that
established no precedent. 14 Thus, for now, the law remains unsettled.
In recent years, a growing body of scholarship has emerged focusing on the
phenomenon of prosecutorial discretion. Scholars have struggled to construct a
constitutional limiting principle that takes realistic account of the ubiquitous and
necessary role that prosecutorial discretion plays in the modem era. 15 Much of
the relevant scholarship has focused not on the constitutional dimensions of the
phenomenon, but rather on the functional discretion left to the Executive through
statutory schemes and the normative merits of greater transparency and
accountability. 16
This Article proposes a new way to think about the constitutional limits of
prosecutorial discretion. 17 While others who have grappled with the

13

136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.), reh 'g denied, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016).
Id. at 2271.
15
See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's
Nonenforcement ofImmigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 781, 783 (2013); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
VAND. L. REV. 671, 717 (2014).
16
See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031,
1034 (2013); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 464 (2009) [hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration
Law]; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 113 (2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, Redux]; Gerald L. Neuman,
Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 614 (2006); Michael Sant' Ambrogio,
The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351,411 (2014); Wadhia, supra note 1, at 264.
17
There is a robust body of scholarship focused on a number of related inquiries that this
Article will not seek to address. Others have done exceptional work regarding the justiciability
of executive nonenforcement decisions. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin:
Judicial Review ofAdministrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 46984 (2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1694-96 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, When Congress
Commands a Thing To Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and
the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253,255 (2003). In the
criminal context, many scholars have examined the problematic intersection between
expansive criminal codes and unchecked prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Rachel E.
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power
and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 19 (1998); James Vorenberg, Decent
14
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constitutional issue have treated prosecutorial discretion across administrative
contexts as a monolith, 18 I suggest that context matters. While it is clear that the
Executive enjoys broad prosecutorial discretion in all enforcement contexts, the
difficult issue is when, if ever, the President may categorically decline to initiate
some set of enforcement proceedings based solely on the President's assessment
that full (or any) enforcement is against the public interest. This is prosecutorial
discretion in its most robust iteration. I refer to such polices as "categorical
prosecutorial discretion policies" throughout this Article. Categorical
prosecutorial discretion policies most clearly raise the specter of the President
usurping Congress' primary policy-making function.
I propose that the dividing line between traditional administrative
enforcement proceedings and those that can potentially result in a deprivation of
physical liberty can offer a workable and well-founded constitutional limiting
principle-with categorical prosecutorial discretion power being permissible
only in the latter context. 19 History is replete with examples of presidents issuing
mass amnesties in both the criminal and immigration contexts-where physical
liberty is at stake-but virtually devoid, until very recent times, of similar
categorical nonenforcement policies in traditional administrative contexts.20 The
historical practice reflects structural features of our Constitution, which place a
premium on the protection of physical liberty as a necessary countermajoritarian
check protecting disfavored minorities against the most coercive powers of the
federal government. The structural bias in favor of liberty protection is further
illuminated by the Pardon Clause's origins and jurisprudence, which also places
a thumb on the scale in favor of the presidential power to exercise

Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (1981). Finally, there is
extensive literature regarding both the scope of the President's power to refuse to enforce or
defend laws the Executive deems unconstitutional and the general aggrandizement of
presidential power in the modem era. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency
Constituiion, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1029 (2004); Neil Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The
Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507,533 (2012); Abner S. Greene, Checks
and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994);
Daniel J. Meltzer, Lecture, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183,
1186 (2012). The analysis in this Article draws upon these important bodies of scholarship
but focuses on distinct issues.
18 See generally Delahanty & Yoo, supra note 15; Price, supra note 15.
19 A deprivation of "physical liberty," as used in this Article, is a restriction on an
individual's physical freedom of movement on par with physical incarceration. The question
of whether deportation satisfies this definition is complex and is discussed at length in Section
III.C. See infra notes 298-302. In short, I conclude that deportation is a restraint of physical
liberty on par with incarceration based on the universally present potential for physical
incarceration, the Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the gravity of the liberty
deprivation associated with deportation, and the Court's habeas jurisprudence which
recognizes that individuals in deportation proceedings satisfy the custody requirement for
habeas corpus purposes. While the application of my thesis to the DACA and DAPA
framework turns on this conclusion, the larger conclusion, that prosecutorial discretion power
is at its height in the liberty deprivation context, operates independently.
20 See infra Part I.
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nonenforcement discretion in the liberty-deprivation context. Historical practice,
the constitutional text and structure, and participatory democratic theory all
militate in favor of a conception of the Executive's prosecutorial discretion
power that is at its zenith when individuals' physical liberty is at stake. This
analysis dictates that categorical prosecutorial discretion policies are only
permissible as a one-way ratchet in favor of liberty protection.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys the early and modem
history of prosecutorial discretion observing that, from the earliest days,
executive discretion has included equitable categorical determinations to forego
enforcement proceedings that could deprive individuals of their physical liberty.
However, only in the modem era have such categorical prosecutorial discretion
policies arisen in other administrative contexts. Part II investigates the
boundaries of prosecutorial discretion authority by assessing the relevant
constitutional provisions and the structural role of liberty protection within the
constitutional scheme. I conclude that the enhanced prosecutorial discretion
power was derived from the Pardon Clause, the Constitution's structural bias
against liberty deprivation, and the dynamics of democratic participatory theory,
which collectively suggest that the Executive's prosecutorial discretion power is
at its zenith when physical liberty is at stake. Finally, Part III examines the outer
boundaries of executive prosecutorial discretion authority in the liberty
deprivation context, focusing on: ( 1) the boundary between modem
prosecutorial discretion and the repudiated common law dispensing power; and
(2) constitutional limiting principles, and what power, if any, Congress has to
cabin executive discretion in the liberty context.

I.

THE HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

There are several types of executive nonenforcement. At times, the President
has refused to spend money appropriated by Congress,2 1 or to promulgate
regulations required by statute,22 or to carry into force specific provisions of a
legislative scheme directing agency action. None of these suspect types of
nonenforcement, however, can be conceived of as prosecutorial discretion.
Prosecutorial discretion is a distinct subset of executive nonenforcement. The
concept of prosecutorial discretion only comes into play when Congress has
enacted a statutory scheme that regulates private conduct and proscribes
penalties for misconduct that can only be triggered by executive prosecution.
The discretion of the Executive to determine when and whether to bring or
abandon such enforcement actions, and how vigorously to pursue them, is
prosecutorial discretion.

21

See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit
K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation ofPowers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1236
(2014).
22
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 500-01 (2007); Cheh, supra note 17, at
276.
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There are many potential purposes served by prosecutorial discretion. 23
Prosecutorial discretion can be aimed at achieving justice when the strict
application of the law or full enforcement of the proscribed penalties is
disproportionate to the specific circumstances of the offense committed. Riding
a bicycle on the sidewalks of New York City, for example, is an offense
punishable by up to twenty days in jail. 24 Based on justice considerations,
prosecutors nearly universally decline to seek the full penalties warranted under
law. At other times, an offense could be severe and warrant full punishment, but
mercy and humanitarian concerns may warrant an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion if, for example the offender is particularly old, young, or infirm.
Prosecutorial discretion decisions are sometimes less connected to the facts and
circumstances related to the individual offense or offender and instead justified
on utilitarian grounds related to larger societal interests.25 The decisions not to
pursue prosecution against President Nixon, for example, was presumably not
driven by a sense that the prescribed penalties for his offenses were too harsh or
by any sense of mercy for him personally. Rather, it seems, the prosecution was
not initiated because President Ford decided that the national interest would be
better served by moving as quickly as possible past that episode in history.
Separate from justice, mercy, and societal utility, prosecutorial discretion is
perhaps most commonly described as serving a purpose related to the efficient
allocation oflimited enforcement resources. 26 In the modem era, there are never
sufficient resources to prosecute all offenses in any enforcement scheme, and
thus choices must be made about which prosecutions to pursue and which to
forego. Prosecutors, whether they be administrative or criminal, the theory goes,
are in a better position than Congress and the judiciary to assess how to most
efficiently utilize the available enforcement resources. For example, prosecutors
are undeniably in the best position to assess the necessary resources a
prosecution will require and, based upon the available evidence, the chances of
success.
With these purposes in mind, below I examine the early and modem history
of prosecutorial discretion as an aid in the search for a workable constitutional
theory of the boundaries of that power. 27

23

See generally Molly Clayton, Forgiving the Unforgivable: Reinvigorating the Use of
Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REV. 751, 756 (2013); Cara H. Drinan,
Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123, 1133 (2012).
24 Bicycle Operation on Sidewalks Prohibited, N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 19-176
(2016).
25
See, e.g., U.S.DEP'TOF JUSTICE,supranote 1, § 9-27.001 ("A determination to prosecute
represents a policy judgment that the fundamental interests of society require the application
of the criminal laws to a particular set ofcircumstances .... ").
26
See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 1, at 244-45.
27
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411,414 (2012) (critically examining the proper role of historical
practice in interpreting the separation of powers).

2017]

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AT ITS ZENITH

497

A. The Early History ofProsecutorial Discretion Practices
There is limited evidence of the Framers' conception of the reach of
prosecutorial discretion power. Alexander Hamilton explained the rationale for
the pardon power. Much of that rationale can be applied equally to other forms
of prosecutorial discretion, though the generalization was not made explicit:
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative
of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The
criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that
without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.28
While there was no direct conversation about the general power of
prosecutorial discretion in the record of the framing of the Constitution,
prosecutorial discretion was an uncontroversial power of the President from the
start. President George Washington personally directed that numerous criminal
and civil prosecutions be initiated and that others be halted. 29 It has been
observed that President Washington's control over "prosecutions was wideranging, largely uncontest.ed by Congress, and acknowledged--even expectedby the Supreme Court."30 In the earliest days of the Union, future Chief Justice
John Marshall had the opportunity to opine on the nature of the President's
prosecutorial discretion authority in discussing the decision of the President to
interrupt a prosecution of an individual accused of murder on board a British
vessel and to instead deliver that person to British authorities. On the floor of
Congress, then-Representative Marshall described the President's prosecutorial
discretion power as "an indubitable and a Constitutional power" which
permitted him alone to determine the "will of the nation" in making decisions
about when to pursue and when to forego prosecutions. 31 This issue of the
President's power to cease a prosecution was first formally presented to the
Attorney General in 1821. The resulting Attorney General opinion determined
that "[t]here can be no doubt of the power of the President to order a nolle
prosequi in any stage of a criminal proceeding in the name of the United
States.... The question appeals to [the President's] discretion; [the President's]
power I think indubitable."32
Early assertions of prosecutorial discretion were not limited to the criminal
context. Two of the early canonical cases establishing the President's
prosecutorial discretion authority arose in the civil arena. In 1831, Attorney
General and later Supreme Court Justice Roger Taney was called upon to
determine whether the President had the authority to order an attorney for the
United States to halt a forfeiture action seeking to condemn jewels which had
been stolen from the Dutch Princess of Orange and illegally brought to the
28
29

THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Andrias, supra note 16, at 1053.

30

Id.

31

10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 615 (1800).
Power to Order a Nolle Prosequi, 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 729, 729 (1821).

32
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United States. 33 The Secretary of State sought to return the jewels to the Princess
without requiring her to engage in a lengthy legal proceeding in the United
States. 34 Taney determined that the President was empowered to exercise such
prosecutorial discretion in the civil context by virtue of his authority to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. "35
In 1868, in consolidated cases also pertaining to civil forfeiture actions
initiated by the United States, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider
the Executive's prosecutorial discretion authority in civil cases. 36 In these postCivil War cases-The Confiscation Cases-the United States had instituted
forfeiture proceedings under a statute that allowed the seizure of property that
had been used to aid the rebellion. Before the Supreme Court, the United States
moved to dismiss the actions, seeking to abandon its claim to the property. 37 An
"informer," who had originally brought the property and its illegal use to the
attention of the authorities, and who was thus entitled to half of the seized
property under the statute, opposed the government's motion. 38 Holding that the
rights of the informer were conditional and that only the United States could
initiate the forfeiture actions, the Court held that the motions must be granted
because the Executive alone had the authority to determine whether to pursue
the enforcement actions. 39 These early cases clarify that the Executive's
prosecutorial discretion powers were not historically limited to the criminal
realm.
Neither was prosecutorial discretion power, in these early years, limited to
individual case-by-case determinations. Broad categorical prosecutorial
discretion policies were implemented by a number of early presidents.
Presidents Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln, and Johnson all
granted amnesty from prosecution to a broad class of individuals. 40 Most of these
amnesties were granted following some armed domestic conflict and protected
the defeated combatants from subsequent prosecution as a means to restore civil
order. President Jefferson, however, granted a categorical pardon to all persons
convicted under the Sedition Act and ordered his district attorneys to enter nolle
prosequis for all ongoing Sedition Act prosecutions, not because of any armed
conflict but because he viewed the Sedition Act as violative of the First

33

The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482, 487 (1831 ).

34

Id at 483.

35

U.S. CONST., art. II,§ 3; see also The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att'y Gen.
at 486; see also Andrias, supra note 16, at 1052-53.
36 The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454,454 (1868).
37
Id. at 456.
38 Id.
39

Id. at 457-62.
See W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT, 39-40 (1941);
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96
GEO. L.J. 1613, 1664-65 (2008).
40
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Amendment. 41 In Armstrong v. United States,42 the Supreme Court assessed the
validity of President Lincoln's categorical amnesty following the Civil War. 43
The Court held that it was squarely within the President's constitutional powers
to grant amnesty to all former supporters of the Confederate States and that no
legislative authorization was required.44
Thus, from the founding through the Civil War, presidents repeatedly invoked
prosecutorial discretion authority in both civil and criminal contexts, and
repeatedly enacted categorical prosecutorial discretion policies. Moreover, the
Supreme Court recognized and affirmed these practices. The early examples of
broad amnesties from prosecution were justified not on the grounds of resource
constraints, but rather on the President's unilateral assessment of the best
interests of the nation. 45
In contrast to these early accepted examples of the President's prosecutorial
discretion powers, it is well established that the Framers intended to deprive the
President of the arguably related "dispensing" and "suspending" powers enjoyed
by the Kings of England before the Glorious Revolution.46 Through these
powers, English kings asserted the ability to license conduct that was otherwise
proscribed by parliamentary law. 47 The record of the Constitutional Convention
demonstrates that the delegates unanimously rejected an effort to grant

41

Prakash, supra note 40, at 1664-65. Technically, the Sedition Act pardons were a series
of individual pardons but, collectively, they can be viewed as a categorical pardon.
42 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1871).
43 Id. at 156.
44
Id.; cf Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877) ("[T]he distinction between
[pardon and amnesty] is one rather of philological interest than oflegal importance."); United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) ("Pardon includes amnesty.").
45 President Jefferson's action stands as an exception, insofar as he acted based upon his
view that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. Justice and mercy considerations also drove
some early presidents' prosecutorial discretion decisions. See, e.g., Letter from President John
Adams to the Attorney General and the District Attorney of Pennsylvania (May 16, 1800), in
9 THE WORKS OF JOIIN ADAMS 56, 56 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850-1856) (directing
nonenforcement based on justice and mercy considerations); Letter from Secretary Alexander
Hamilton, U.S. Department of the Treasury, to Jeremiah Olney (Sept. 24, 1791), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 236, 236 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) (same); Letter from
President Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, U.S. District Attorney for Virginia (May 20,
1807), in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 394, 394-401 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905)
(same).
46 JACKN. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 20 (1996).
47 The distinction between suspending and dispensing powers was often blurred.
JACQUELINE ROSE, GODLY KINGSHIP IN RESTORATION ENGLAND: THE POLITICS OF THE ROYAL
SUPREMACY, 1660-1688, at 91 (2011); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 857. The
distinction, however, lay in the sweep of the license. Insofar as the King abrogated a statute
across the board, it was referred to as "suspending"; when the King granted individuals
permission to act outside the law, it was referred to as "dispensing." CHRISTOPHER N. MAY,
PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" LAWS 4 (1998); Delahunty & Yoo, supra
note 15, at 804 n.135.
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"suspending" powers to the President. 48 Some have misread the Framers'
emphatic rejection of the dispensing and suspending powers as a repudiation of
the power of the President to exercise prosecutorial discretion based upon
justice, mercy, or utilitarian societal considerations.49 Opponents of President
Obama's DAPA program have specifically accused the President of attempting
to "dispense" with the nation's deportation laws. 50
There is, however, a critical distinction between prosecutorial discretion and
the repudiated suspending and dispensing powers. The distinction is primarily
temporal. No one today would claim that the President could ex ante grant
permission for an individual to violate an act of Congress. That is distinct,
however, from the Executive's ex post determination not to prosecute. The
DACA and DAPA programs, for example, are explicitly backward looking; they
only apply to individuals who unlawfully entered the country years before the
programs were announced. 51 As Sir Matthew Hale explained in the latter half of
the seventeenth century, this key difference is what distinguished the common
law pardon power, which was carried forward in our Constitution, and the
dispensing power, which was not. As he explained, a pardon "dispenseth with
the penalty, not the obligation" to comply with the law but a dispensation from
the King "dispenseth both with the penalty and obligation of a law and is
precedent. " 52
The elimination of the dispensing and suspending powers in England did
nothing to disrupt the King's broad pardon power-referred to as the King's
prerogative. Indeed pardons were in fact used with great frequency following
the elimination of the dispensing and suspending powers.53 One critical reason
for the distinction is that an ex ante license to violate the law completely
eliminates the law's deterrent effect. In addition to being limited to ex post
usage, the King's prerogative, unlike the suspending and dispensing powers,
could only be invoked in relation to offenses against the state and, thus, could

48 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 103-04 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)
[hereinafter RECORDS]; see also Price, supra note 15, at 693.
49 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, 798-808.
50 Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Memorandum in Support at 5, Texas v.
United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 15-00674).
51 See infra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
52 MATTHEW HALE, THEPREROGATIVESOFTHEKlNG 177 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1976);seealso
William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 475, 495-96 (1977) ("There is a technical distinction between pardon and
suspension: pardon frees the guilty party from the effect of a violation of the law; suspension
makes legal a formerly illegal act.").
53 See Duker, supra note 52, at 495-96; David D. Friedman, Making Sense ofEnglish Law
Enforcement in the Eighteenth Century, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 475, 496-98 (1995)
(noting the "extensive use of pardons" in England between 1660 and 1800 when only about
forty percent of those convicted of capital felonies were actually executed and the rest
pardoned though, especially after 1718, a pardon was often conditional on transportation to
American colonies).
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not be used to interfere in private law disputes or to unsettle privately held
rights. 54
Indeed, the incident that is credited with leading to the elimination of the
dispensing power demonstrates the distinction between prosecutorial discretion
and dispensing. King James II invoked his dispensing power to appoint fellow
Roman Catholics to various public positions, relieving these individuals of the
operation of the parliamentary Test Act requirements that public officials
denounce certain Roman Catholic doctrine and receive the Anglican
sacrament. 55 It was this use of the dispensing power that is largely credited with
leading to the Glorious Revolution and the elimination of the King's dispensing
and suspending powers. 56 King James H's use of dispensing is unrecognizable
as an act of prosecutorial discretion. By dispensing with the requirements of the
Test Act, he bestowed an affirmative benefit prohibited by law. As such, it was
completely unrelated to any decision to forego an enforcement action. Based
upon the distinctions in their nature and the history of their use, it is difficult to
read the Framers' rejection of the suspending and dispensing powers as a limit
on the President's power to make equitable prosecutorial discretion
determinations.
B. Modern Categorical Prosecutorial Discretion Policies

In the modem era, prosecutorial discretion is a ubiquitous phenomenon. The
explosion in scope of prohibited conduct, in both criminal and administrative
contexts, and the inability or unwillingness of the nation to authorize sufficient
enforcement resources to keep pace with the expansion have cemented
prosecutorial discretion as a critical and prominent feature in modem federal law
enforcement. It is now widely accepted that federal administrative and criminal
prosecutors routinely make individualized prosecutorial discretion
determinations. Prosecutorial discretion only becomes controversial when the
Executive puts in place categorical or rule-based policies. This is particularly
true insofar as those policies appear to be driven less by justice, mercy, or
efficiency considerations and more by the Executive's independent normative
judgment regarding the societal interest or utility of nonenforcement.
Accordingly, I examine below such categorical prosecutorial discretion policies
of modem presidents.
In the criminal context, as discussed above, such categorical grants of
prosecutorial discretion have been utilized since the founding of the nation. 57

54

Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925); see also Duker, supra note 52, at 486
(explaining how the King's pardon power was limited to offenses against the state and did not
extend to matters that directly implicated the rights of third parties).
55 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 805-06; Dennis Dixon, Godden v Hales RevisitedJames JI and the Dispensing Power, 27 J. LEGAL HIST. 129, 129-37 (2006).
56 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 805.
57 See discussion supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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That practice has been carried forward by modern presidents. 58 President Carter,
for example, on his very first day in office, issued a categorical unconditional
pardon to approximately a half million men who had violated draft laws to avoid
military service in Vietnam, most of whom had never been formally charged,
because he sought to "heal the war's [psychic] wounds."59 Carter's action was
modeled on special boards which Presidents Truman and Ford had used to grant
clemency to tens of thousands of individuals who had avoided military service
in World War II and Vietnam, respectively. 60
More recently, under President Clinton, the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
enacted a "Corporate Leniency Policy"-which the DOJ describes as an
"amnesty or corporate immunity program"-that grants effective immunity
from criminal prosecution to corporations, as well as their directors, officers,
and employees, if the corporation is the first to come forward and report illegal
antitrust activity and take certain other designated remedial steps. 61 Notably, the
DOJ has made clear that "the grant of amnesty is certain and is not subject to the

58 The same pattern is visible in state-level criminal prosecutorial discretion policies. In
recent years, several governors have granted categorical clemency to all inmates on death
row. See Capital Punishment Clemency, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/massincarceration/clemency-and-pardons/capital-punishment-clemency [https://perma.cc/E2KJGN9H] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (detailing how Pat Quinn of Illinois in 2011, Jon Corzine
of New Jersey in 2007, George Ryan of Illinois 2003, and Toney Anaya of New Mexico in
1986 granted clemency to all death-row inmates). Categorical nonenforcement on the state
level has also been a mechanism used when criminal statutes fall out of touch with evolving
social norms. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) ("In those States where
sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private. The State of Texas
admitted in 1994 that as of that date it had not prosecuted anyone under those
circumstances."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 498, 507-08 (1961) (holding that, without a
showing of a real enforcement threat, there is insufficient grounds to adjudicate the
constitutionality of a uniformly unenforced statute that prohibited the use of contraceptive
devices); see also Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Limits When He'll
Target Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, at Al7 ("[T]he Brooklyn district attorney's
office announced on Tuesday that it would immediately carry out its plan to stop prosecuting
most low-level marijuana cases.").
59 Proclamation No. 4483, 42 Fed. Reg. 4391 (Jan. 24, 1977) (authorizing a full, complete,
and unconditional pardon to those who violated the Military Selective Service Act during the
Vietnam War); Andrew Glass, Carter Pardons Draft Dodgers Jan. 21, 1977, POLITICO, (Jan.
21, 2008, 3:56 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2008/0l/carter-pardons-draft-dodgersjan-21-1977-007974 [https://perma.cc/8SJA-AVB9].
60 Exec. Order No. 9814, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,645 (Dec. 25, 1946) (creating the President's
Amnesty Board to review convictions of persons under the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940); U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, at xi-xii
(1975); Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential Pardons, 13 FED.
SENT'G. REP. 139, 142 (2001).
61 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm [https://perma.ccN5VS-MKZX].
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exercise of [individualized] prosecutorial discretion."62 Most recently, President
Obama also announced broad nonenforcement guidelines related to marijuana
offenses in states that have legalized various aspects of marijuana use and sale. 63
By one count, at least one third of all United States presidents have issued
categorical prosecutorial discretion policies of one kind or another in the
criminal context. 64 Moreover, the Supreme Court has been clear about the
constitutional nature of the Executive's "absolute discretion to decide whether
to prosecute a [criminal] case,"65 including the power to grant broad categorical
amnesties from criminal prosecution. 66 All of this, however, only begs the
question of whether broad executive power in the criminal realm reflects a
criminal exceptionalism or, rather, whether it illuminates something about the
role prosecutorial discretion plays in the constitutional structure. I will return to
this issue in Part II.
In the administrative arena, however, presidential policy making has, until
recently, focused much more on the rulemaking process than on enforcement. 67
The significant use of nonenforcement policies in the administrative realm, at
least outside the immigration realm discussed below, is a relatively recent
phenomenon. President George W. Bush was the first68 to use categorical

62 Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
The Corporate Leniency Policy: Answers to Recurring Questions, Remarks at the ABA
Antitrust
Section
1998
Spring
Meeting
(Apr.
I,
1998),
http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1626.htm [https://perma.cc/CNZ6-HNBK].
63 The Obama marijuana policy, unlike the Carter pardons and the Corporate Leniency
Policy, are styled more as guidelines than categorical rules. See Memorandum from James M.
Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All U.S. Att'ys (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[https://perma.ccN6FR-FVGX]; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Selected U.S. Attorneys (Oct.
19, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-attomeysinvestigations-and-prosecutions-states [https://perma.cc/MF4Z-8NZ3].
64 Shanor & Miller, supra note 60, at 139.
65 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing The Confiscation Cases, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 454,457 (1869)); United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 511 (11th Cir. 1996)
(noting that prosecutorial discretion does not lend itself to judicial intervention); Smith v.
United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967) (describing the power as "absolute" and
"required in all cases"); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
66 Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 154, 155-56 (1871).
67 Andrias, supra note 16, at 1055-60 (discussing the development of the President's
influence over the administrative state, from rulemaking to specific enforcement actions).
68 While President Bush brought it to scale, President Reagan pioneered the use of
categorical nonenforcement in the administrative realm with systemic resistance to enforcing
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Liability Act, otherwise known as the
"Superfund Law." See Joel A. Mintz, EPA Enforcement of CERCLA: Historical Overview
and Recent Trends, 41 Sw. L. REV. 645, 646-57 (2012). President Reagan also sought to drive
down enforcement to achieve policy goals in other realms, but did so more by seeking
reductions in the budgets of enforcement agencies he disfavored. Andrias, supra note 16, at

504

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:489

nonenforcement as a significant feature of his administrative policy-making
efforts. 69
In the environmental context, President Bush sought to ramp down
enforcement actions related to provisions of the Clean Air Act that imposed
heightened pollution control requirements for coal-fired power plants that
undergo modifications. 70 After promulgating a rule to that effect and having the
rule struck down by the D.C. Circuit,71 the Bush Administration issued an
internal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") enforcement policy, which
directed agency officials not to initiate enforcement actions against the category
of power plants that would have been protected by the nullified rule. 72 In several
other arenas, including the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the
Department of Labor ("DOL"), the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), civil rights, and voting rights, 73 while no explicit policy was ever made

1058-59.
69 Price, supra note 15, at 686 ("The George W. Bush Administration apparently
underenforced certain environmental, product safety, and civil rights laws as a matter of
policy; in one case the Environmental Protection Agency stopped enforcing certain air
pollution restrictions after the D.C. Circuit declared its regulatory standards too permissive.");
see also Andrias, supra note 16, at 1061 ("In general, Bush exercised more extensive control
over enforcement than did many of his predecessors. Across agencies, there was a significant
trend toward deregulation through nonenforcement and a shift toward different enforcement
priorities, consistent with the Administration's articulated policy goals."); Daniel T. Deacon,
Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 807-15 (2010)
(providing examples of informal enforcement policies in the Bush Administration that
essentially created a "category-wide determination not to prosecute certain crimes
altogether").
70 Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics ofNew Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1677, 167879 (2007).
71
New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the newly enacted
Equipment Replacement Provision rule violated the Clean Air Act).
72
Andrias, supra note 16, at 1062-63; see also Joel A. Mintz, "Treading Water": A
Preliminary Assessment ofEPA Enforcement During the Bush JI Administration, 34 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,933, 10,939 (2004) (noting a statement by EPA's Assistant Administrator "that the
goal of the NSR reform was to prevent any enforcement cases from going forward").
73 See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM,· 109TH CONG., PRESCRIPTION FOR
HARM: THE DECLINE IN FDA ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY 7 (2006) (documenting fifty percent
reduction in FDA warning letters); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-10-75, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: INFORMATION ON ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FROM FISCAL YEARS 2001
THROUGH 2007, at 23-37, 57-83 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/297337.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BZ7Y-PT4W] (documenting the Bush Administration's reduction in
enforcement of employment and voting rights laws); Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration
and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 81 (2009) (same);
see also Andrias, supra note 16, at 1062-63 (documenting the Bush Administration's
nonenforcement of securities and civil rights laws); Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed:
Regulators Against Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 309-17 (2009)
(detailing the SEC's enforcement failures under the Bush Administration).
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public, dramatic reductions in enforcement consistent with the public political
position of the Administration evince a widespread use of categorical
prosecutorial discretion as a policy-making tool. 74
President Obama carried forward the Bush Administration's use of
categorical prosecutorial discretion policies as a policy-making tool; though, the
new administration, unlike the Bush Administration, tended to announce their
policies in public policy memoranda. While the recent immigration programs
are surely the most prominent example, President Obama's Treasury
Department and Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") have also
publicly announced categorical prosecutorial discretion policies related to
certain enforcement mechanisms for noncompliant insurance plans under the
Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). The ACA set a statutory deadline for insurance
plans to meet certain minimum substantive coverage requirements. 75 The statute
empowered HHS to initiate civil enforcement action for noncompliant plans.76
When individuals began having their health insurance preemptively canceled
due to the looming deadline, and the President's pledge that those who like their
health insurance would not have to change plans began being called into
question, the Administration announced that it would, for a period of time, not
bring any enforcement action related to certain provisions of the statutory
scheme. 77 The President could not, of course, change the statutory deadline;
however, because he viewed the implementation timeline as counter to the
public interest, he used his purported enforcement discretion to categorically
refuse to initiate any enforcement actions during, what he deemed, a
"transitional period. "78
There is extremely limited case law evaluating the scope of prosecutorial
discretion authority in the modem administrative era. The leading case, and
indeed one of the only cases, regarding the scope of prosecutorial discretion
authority in the administrative context is Heckler v. Chaney. 79 In Heckler, the

14 See Andrias, supra note 16, at 1062 (observing that President Bush's nonenforcement
policies were often not made public or memorialized).
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg to -21 (2012) (limiting instances in which issuers may impose
preexisting condition exclusions).
16 Id.§ 300gg-22(a)(2), (b).
77 Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Dep't of Health
&
Human
Servs.,
to
State
Ins.
Comm'rs
(Nov.
14,
2013),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-142013 .pdf [http://perma.cc/T3VW-66DZ]; I.R.S. Notice2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116 (July 29,
2013) (notifying employers and other reporting entities of the transition relief provided for
2014 from certain reporting requirements under sections 6055 and 6056 of the Internal
Revenue Code); see also Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage,
78 Fed. Reg. 8543, 8569 (Feb. 12, 2014); Robert Pear, Rules for Equal Coverage by
Employers Remain Elusive Under Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A18 (discussing
delays in the enforcement of certain provisions of the ACA).
78 Letter from Gary Cohen, supra note 77, at 1.
79 470 U.S. 821, 823 (1985).
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Court was called upon to review the FDA's decision not to initiate enforcement
actions against states for administering certain allegedly ''unsafe" drugs to
persons whom the state had sentenced to death by lethal injection. 80 While the
decision ultimately rested on statutory grounds, the case provides a rare glimpse
into the Court's view of the historic scope and constitutional dimensions of
administrative prosecutorial discretion authority. In declining to initiate such
enforcement proceedings, the FDA specifically cited its "inherent discretion to
decline to pursue certain enforcement matters."81 In the course of its analysis,
the Court was clear regarding its view that an "agency's decision not to
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion," though the Court did
recognize mechanisms by which Congress could exert some control over agency
enforcement decisions. 82 The Court also noted the agency's power to set its own
enforcement priorities as well as that "when an agency refuses to act it generally
does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property
rights." 83 Finally, the Court specifically drew the connection between the
"agency's refusal to institute proceedings" and the "decision of a prosecutor in
the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision which has long been regarded as
the special province of the Executive Branch."84
In the end, however, the primary rationale for rejecting the challenge in
Heckler was the Court's conclusion that nonenforcement decisions are generally
unsuitable for judicial review. 85 In cases that have followed Heckler in the
administrative law context, the only clear principle to be discerned from the
Court's jurisprudence is the general unwillingness of courts to review agency
nonenforcement decisions. 86 While the case law is extremely limited, practice in
the modern era evinces the pervasive role that prosecutorial discretion plays
generally in all federal enforcement schemes, as well as examples of presidents
carrying forward the historical use of categorical prosecutorial discretion
policies in the criminal realm. Outside the immigration context, however, the
use of similar policies in civil administrative arenas is a relatively recent

Id
Id. at 824.
82 Id. at 831, 833 (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 832.
84 Id. In addition, three of the four cases that the Court relied upon in Heckler to establish
the principle that administrative nonenforcement decisions are presumptively nonreviewable
involved prosecutorial discretion to decline to enforce criminal laws. Id. at 845 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("The other three cases-Batchelder, Nixon, and the Confiscation Cases-all
involve prosecutorial discretion to enforce the criminal law.").
85 Id. at 832 (majority opinion) ("[A]n agency's decision not to take enforcement action
should be presumed immune from judicial review ....").
86 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (reaffirming general
nonreviewability ofnonenforcement decisions); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 183 (1993)
(same); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (noting that the NLRB's General Counsel
"has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint").
80
81
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innovation-with Presidents Bush and Obama being the first to utilize such
policies on any significant scale.
C. The History ofProsecutorial Discretion in the Immigration Arena

It makes sense to consider the use of prosecutorial discretion in the
immigration arena separately, both because the practice in this arena stands in
stark contrast to the practice in other civil administrative contexts, and because
context is particularly important and timely given the active debate and litigation
related to the DACA and DAPA programs. Similar to other administrative
realms, the Court has had only limited opportunities in recent years to opine on
the breadth of prosecutorial discretion authority in the context of immigration
enforcement and has never articulated the constitutional limits of such
authority. 87 In regard to historical practice in the immigration arena, others have
exhaustively cataloged the history of immigration prosecutorial discretion
practices, and a full recitation of that history is unnecessary. 88 A brief review is,
however, important to the analysis that follows.
There are estimated to be approximately eleven million undocumented
immigrants in the United States. 89 The population of lawfully present
immigrants, who can also be subject to deportation proceedings,90 is estimated
to be over thirteen million. 91 While appropriations for immigration enforcement
operations now exceed $18 billion annually92-more than the combined budgets
of the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, Secret Service, U.S. Marshals
Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives93-under

87

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012); Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). In Arizona v. United States, the Court
struck down a state law permitting local authorities to make federal immigration arrests
because it held that the state law infringed on the prosecutorial discretion that Congress had
delegated to the federal agencies. 132 S. Ct. at 2505. In Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee, the Court determined that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear
a selective prosecution challenge from a group of immigrants facing deportation. However,
in the course of its analysis, the Court did analogize prosecutorial discretion power in the
criminal and immigration context to emphasize that "exercising [] discretion for humanitarian
reasons or simply for [the Executive's] own convenience" is the "special province of the
Executive." 525 U.S. at 484, 489.
88 See, e.g., SHOBA SNAPRASAD WADHlA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 14-32 (2015); Cox & Rodriguez,
President and Immigration Law, supra note 16, at 458; Neuman, supra note 16, at 611;
Wadhia, supra note 1, at 244.
89
OLC Opinion, supra note 11, at 1.
90 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012).
91 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE
LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2012, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/ois_ lpr_pe_ 2012.pdf [https://penna.cc/8Q43-LEKN].
92 DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 2-3.
93 Id.
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current appropriations, DHS can deport, at most, a few hundred thousand
individuals per year. 94 With almost twenty-five million individuals potentially
subject to deportation and a capacity to target only a few hundred thousand
people per year, prosecutorial discretion is necessarily a prominent feature of the
immigration enforcement scheme. 95
Since 1975, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") and later its
successor agency, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agency,
have issued a series of prosecutorial discretion memoranda that set forth basic
guidelines for agency lawyers and agents to follow in making prosecutorial
discretion determinations. 96 The memoranda direct agents to consider various
equitable factors. 97 The more recent memoranda, however, also set forth
enforcement priorities-detailing not only the humanitarian factors to be
considered in deciding when to forego enforcement but also the aggravating
factors to be considered in deciding who to target for enforcement. 98 The current
policy targets primarily individuals who have criminal convictions, including in
some cases a single misdemeanor conviction, and individuals who have recently
unlawfully entered the United States. 99
The current priorities memorandum was announced in November 2014 on the
same day that the DHS announced its DAPA program. However, the priorities
memorandum's targeting criteria were only a modest revision to publicly
announced priorities that had been in place since 2011. 100 Under both the new
and old priorities, the vast majority of the millions of potentially removable
immigrants in the United States were designated as nonpriorities for removal.
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OLC Opinion, supra note 11, at 1.
See Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law, supra note 16, at 463.
96
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec., to Thomas
S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, et al. 3-4 (Nov. 20, 2014)
[hereinafter Johnson Priorities Memorandum], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/14_ 1120_ memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU68-EMYC];
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Immigration & Customs Enft, to Field Office Dirs.,
Special Agents in Charge, & Chief Counsel 2 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Priorities
Memorandum],
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DBM-973D]; Memorandum from Julie L. Myers,
Assistant Sec'y, Immigration & Customs Enft, to Field Office Dirs. & Special Agents in
Charge (Nov. 7, 2007); Memorandum from Bo Cooper, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., to Comm'r Through the Deputy Comm'r, 1 INS & DOJ LEGAL OPINIONS
§99-5 (2006); Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enft, to OPLA Chief Counsel 2 (Oct. 24, 2005); Memorandum from
Doris Meissner, Comm'r oflmmigration & Naturalization Serv., to Reg'l Dirs. et al. 1 (Nov.
17, 2000); Memorandum from Paul W. Virtue, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm'r, Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., to Reg'l Dirs. (June 27, 1997); (LEGACY) IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, 0I § 103.l(a)(l)(ii) (1975).
97 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Morton Priorities Memorandum supra note 96, at 5.
99
Johnson Priorities Memorandum, supra note 96, at 3-4.
10
Compare id., with Morton Priorities Memorandum, supra note 96, at 5.
95

°

2017]

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AT ITS ZENITH

509

Thus a sweeping public prosecutorial discretion policy had been in place for
several years at the time of the DAPA announcement. The policy was plainly
based upon the Obama Administration's normative judgments about the national
interests served, or not served, in deporting various categories of immigrants.
However, notwithstanding the breadth of these policies and the Executive's
policy-making judgment in announcing these policies, neither prompted
lawsuits or even calls that the President had exceeded the boundaries of his
prosecutorial discretion authority.
It was instead the announcements of the President's DACA and DAPA
programs that prompted some to call into question the boundaries of the
President's prosecutorial discretion policies. The DACA program, which was
originally announced on June 15, 2012, dictated that any person who (1) came
to the United States before the age of sixteen, (2) had been present in the United
States for at least five years on the date of the announcement, (3) was engaged
in or had completed certain educational programs or military service, and (4)
was under the age of thirty could be "considered for an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion" if that person had not committed certain criminal offertses. 101 The
memorandum announcing the program stated that decisions about prosecutorial
discretion under the DACA program are to be made on a "case-by-case basis"
and that the memorandum does not ensure that all persons meeting the prima
facie eligibility criteria will be granted prosecutorial discretion. 102 When
discretion was exercised under the program, however, the memorandum made
clear that individuals would be granted "deferred action status" and that they
could apply for work authorization. 103
Deferred action, along with a variety of other nonstatutory formal
prosecutorial discretion designations, has been utilized by federal immigration
authorities for decades and has been recognized by both the Supreme Court and
Congress. 104 As the DACA memorandum makes explicit, deferred action is not
an immigration status and does not create any substantive right or any pathway
to citizenship. 105 Rather, it is a formal statement from DHS that it has, for a
temporary period, decided to forego the initiation of any enforcement actions. 106
The recipients of DACA are young people deemed worthy of mercy because
they lack culpability for their own unauthorized entry into the Unites States. 107
According to the Obama Administration, DACA also would increase

101

DACA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1.
Id. at 2.
103 Id. at 3.
104 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999)
(recognizing deferred action status as a longstanding practice of the INS's executive
discretion); 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(D)(i)(II), (IV) {2012) (stating that qualifying individuals
may be "eligible for deferred action and work authorization").
105 DACA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3.
106 See id. at 2-3.
101 Id. at 1 (stating that DACA recipients were generally individuals "who were brought to
this country as children" and thus "lacked the intent to violate the law").
102
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enforcement efficiency by shrinking the haystack of unauthorized immigrants,
thus allowing ICE to focus on its intended targets. 108 Finally, in the
Administration's view, DACA recipients contribute more to society and pose a
lesser danger than the individuals identified as targets by the priorities
memorandum. 109
The DAPA program, announced on November 20, 2014, extended deferred
action, on the same terms as the DACA program, to "adults who have been in
this country since January 1, 2010, are the parents of U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents, and who are otherwise not enforcement priorities." 110
While the DACA program was significant, and benefited hundreds of thousands
of young people, the DAPA program was vast by comparison. 111 It was
estimated that over five million of the nation's estimated eleven million
undocumented individuals could qualify for DAPA. 112 Again, the Obama
Administration justified the program by explaining that the people who would
benefit are "hard-working people" who do not pose a danger to public safety and
bringing these people "out of the shadows" would be in the country's "security
and economic interests." 113
Notably, the reach of the highly controversial DACA and DAPA programs
was dramatically smaller than the reach of the relatively uncontroversial
enforcement priorities memoranda that had been in place for years. 114 Thus, the
size of the program alone cannot explain the outcry. Three factors have been.
identified at various times to distinguish the exercise of prosecutorial discretion

108

See id (noting that young people brought to the country as children were "low priority
cases" and DACA allowed ICE to "appropriately focus[] on people who meet [its]
enforcement priorities").
109
Id. at 1-2 ("[M]any of these young people have already contributed to our country in
significant ways."). See generally OLC Opinion, supra note 11 (identifying certain categories
of undocumented individuals for prioritized removal and other categories for deferred action).
110 DAPA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3. The DAPA Memorandum also relaxed certain
requirements of the original DACA program, expanding eligibility to that program as well.

Id
111 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD
ARRlvALS
PROCESS
(THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2016,
4TH QTR)
(2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-i-821 ddeferred-action-childhood-arrivals [https://perma.cc/NRR3-ZGN4] (recording the total
number of initial deferred action applications approved through September 30, 2016 at
752,154).
112
See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Immigration
Accountability Executive Action (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action
[https://perma.cc/U9WH-QZVL].
113 DAPA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3.
114 See MARC R. ROSENBLUM, UNDERSTANDING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE
ACTION ON IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1 (2015) (estimating that about eight million
immigrants are protected by the priorities memoranda, while approximately five million
immigrants are protected by the DACA and DAPA programs).
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under the priorities memoranda from the exercise of such discretion under the
DACA and DAPA programs. First, under the latter but not the former,
individuals are given a formal designation noting they have been the subject of
prosecutorial discretion. 115 Thus, the theory goes, the programs may undermine
any incentive that the ongoing risk of enforcement may create for individuals to
"self-deport." 116 Second, the DACA and DAPA programs, unlike prosecutorial
discretion under the priorities memoranda, carry with them a significant
affirmative benefit: work authorization. 117 Finally, unlike the priorities
memoranda, the particular context of the DACA and DAPA programs create, at
minimum, the impression that the President was using prosecutorial discretion
to achieve an end-run around Congress. 118
As to the first distinction, putting aside the well-documented skepticism of
the "self-deportation" theory, the presence of a formal grant of prosecutorial
discretion in the DACA and DAPA programs does not set the programs apart
from a wide array of other broad nonstatutory prosecutorial discretion programs
that have been a staple of immigration enforcement schemes for decades. 119
Several mechanisms have been developed that allow the Executive to exercise
an enormous amount of unilateral power to enact formal categorical
prosecutorial discretion designations. 120 Under a program called Extended
Voluntary Departure ("EVD"), similar in effect to deferred action, Presidents
Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Reagan all temporarily halted deportation
efforts against certain nationalities at various times. 121 Similarly, in 1990,
President Bush used his discretion to defer the deportation of Chinese
immigrants through an executive order. 122 In perhaps the most analogous
precursor to DACA and DAPA, in 1990, the INS implemented the "family
115

See DACA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2-3; DAPA Memorandum, supra note 2, at

3-5.
116 Josh Blackman, DAPA and Self-Deportation, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Nov. 20,
2015),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/11/20/dapa-and-self-deportation/
[https://perma.cc/ED52-Y3C5] (arguing that DAPA undermined Congress's intent to make it
harder for undocumented individuals to find employment to pressure them to "self-deport").
117 See DACA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3; DAPA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 4.
118 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 835.
119 See generally Adam Serwer, "Self-Deportation": It's a Real Thing, and It Isn't Pretty,
MOTHER
JONES
(Jan.
23,
2012,
10:59
PM),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/01/romneys-self-deportation-just-another-termalabama-style-immigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/F886-BCYQ] (criticizing "selfdeportation" as an immigration policy for its "complete lack of discretion and flexibility").
120 Some of the text below explaining examples of such programs is drawn from a petition
for rulemaking submitted to DHS by the National Day Labor Organizing Network, which was
coauthored by the author of this Article.
121 See Lynda J. Oswald, Extended Voluntary Departure: Limiting the Attorney General's
Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REv.152, 157-60 (1986); Jeffrey L. Romig,
Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 295,310 n.92. (1985).
122 Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (Apr. 11, 1990).
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fairness policy," which granted EVD to approximately 1.5 million immigrants
who were excluded from the 1986 statutory amnesty program but whose spouses
or parents were beneficiaries. 123 There have also been broad deferred action
programs implemented to benefit victims of domestic violence, human
trafficking, and other crimes; foreign students affected by Hurricane Katrina;
and widows and widowers of U.S. citizens. 124 There is simply nothing novel
about a broad, nonstatutory formal prosecutorial discretion program in the
immigration context.
The second distinction-that the programs do more than exercise
prosecutorial discretion but also grant an affirmative benefit-certainly takes
these programs out of the traditional exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
However, notwithstanding the rhetoric around this issue, the Administration
never justified its granting of work authorization to DACA and DAPA recipients
on its constitutional prosecutorial discretion powers. 125 Rather, the
Administration is able to grant these individuals work authorization only
because Congress has explicitly empowered the Attorney General to determine
which classes of immigrants are eligible for such authorization. 126 Affirmative
benefits, such as work authorization, cannot be and have not been justified by
the President's constitutional prosecutorial discretion authority.
It is the third factor that truly distinguishes the DACA and DAP A programs
from the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the priorities memoranda.
DACA was only announced after the President tried and failed to convince
Congress to pass the DREAM Act, which would have granted residency and a
path to citizenship to the class of individuals now eligible for DACA. 127 The
DAPA program, meanwhile, was only announced after the President tried and
failed to convince Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform, which
would have granted residency and a path to citizenship for a similar class of the
123 Memorandum from Gene McNary, Comm'r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., to
Reg'l Comm'rs, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. (Feb. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Family
Fairness Memorandum]; Reagan-Bush Family Fairness: A Chronological History, AM.
IMMIGR.
COUNS.
(Dec.
9,
2014),
https ://www .ametjcanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/reagan-bush-family-faimesschronological-history [https://perma.cc/DT75-G7X7]; see also Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of8 U.S.C).
124
OLC Opinion, supra note 11, at 15-17.
125
See DACA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that "the memorandum confers no
substantive right" and that only Congress can confer such rights "through its legislative
authority"); DAPA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that the deferred action and work
authorization program were "within the framework of existing law" and conferred no new
substantive right).
126
8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(3), 1324a(h)(3) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(l4) (2016).
127
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 787-91 (discussing how President Obama
effectively enacted the DREAM Act through deferred action, starting with the priorities
memoranda and culminating with the DACA program that "mapped. closely" on to the criteria
specified in the DREAM Act).
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undocumented population as those who have benefited from the DAPA
program. 128 These dynamics create, at minimum, the appearance that the
President is attempting to use his prosecutorial discretion power to make an endrun around Congress. Notably, neither program bestows the benefits-residency
and a path to citizenship--that the contemplated legislation would have
provided. 129 The appearance of gamesmanship is, however, undeniable.
Interestingly, the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") specifically relied upon the
fact that the programs are "consonant with congressional policy." 130 But
assuming arguendo that the DACA and DAPA programs do create some
dissonance with the statutory scheme, the familiar Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Strnyer 131 framework certainly requires a serious analysis of the nature of
the President's prosecutorial discretion power in the face of active congressional
resistance. 132 The Article returns to this issue in Section III.C.
Thus, history demonstrates that prosecutorial discretion, in both the criminal
and civil contexts, has been an established, and virtually unquestioned,
constitutional power of the President from the earliest days of the nation. 133 In
the criminal context, broad categorical prosecutorial discretion policies have
been enacted by presidents and affirmed by the Supreme Court throughout the
nation's history. 134 Notably, in the administrative context, immigration stands
alone as the only administrative arena where categorical prosecutorial discretion
programs have been a regular feature of the enforcement landscape for
decades-ever since the government's deportation programs became a
significant feature of federal law enforcement. 135 In other administrative

128 See Seung Min Kim & Jennifer Epstein, Obama to Take Action. on Immigration,
POLITICO (July 1, 2014, 08:28 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/obamaimmigration-reform-108447 [https://perma.cc/KRL4-J627] (discussing how President
Obama planned to take administrative action after comprehensive immigration reform failed
to pass).
129 DACA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that the memorandum provides no
"immigration status or pathway to citizenship"); DAPA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5
(same).
130 OLC Opinion, supra note 11, at 24. But see Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 16,
at 151 ( arguing that congressional intent and priorities cannot provide a meaningful limitation
on the President's discretion in the immigration context).
131 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
132 Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (establishing the three-part framework for
analyzing the constitutionality of presidential action and stating that "[w]hen the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb").
133 See supra Section I.A.
134
See supra Section I.A.
135 Over the last decade, the annual number of deportations has hovered between 300,000
and 400,000. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2012 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS tbl.39
(2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_
Statistics_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QJV-KF98]. Prior to 1992, however, the total annual
number of deportations never exceeded 40,000 and often dipped below 10,000. Id.
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contexts, the use of categorical nonenforcement as a policy-making tool is a
relatively recent phenomenon. 136

II. ' THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
POWER AND THE ROLE OF LIBERTY

A central tension in our constitutional framework is the purposefully designed
struggle for power between the political branches of the federal government. As
James Madison explained, it is "essential to the preservation of liberty" that
"[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition." 137 Through this lens, the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion can be understood, in part, as an important
countermajoritarian structural check on the power of the legislature.
Prosecutorial discretion can play a critical role in mitigating the dangers of
overly punitive legislative schemes that target minority communities in ways
that are counter to justice or to the public interest. 138
Taken to its extreme, however, prosecutorial discretion could place too great
a thumb on the scale of presidential power, fundamentally undermining
Congress's primary policy-making role. In the modern administrative state,
executive branch enforcement is a necessary and critical component of a vast
array of federal policy implementation.13 9 Unchecked, a president could use
purported prosecutorial discretion authority to unilaterally halt or substantially
undermine agency enforcement actions across a broad range of subject areas. 140
This abuse of executive discretion could include not only Department of
Homeland Security's enforcement of immigration laws, but also the SEC's
enforcement of securities laws, the Internal Revenue Service's enforcement of

136

See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("But
the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The
provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger
of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.").
138 See id at 323 ("It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of
the other part .... If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will
be insecure."); see also Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 368 (Ky. 2006) ("Once called
the executive's 'benign prerogative of mercy,' the pardon/amnesty power has evolved to serve
as a mechanism which simultaneously checks and balances the powers of the legislature (that
make the laws), [and] the judiciary (that interprets/enforces the laws) ...." (internal citation
omitted)).
139 See generally Andrias, supra note 16 (arguing that executive oversight over the
coordination and enforcement of federal programs increases the efficiency, efficacy, and
accountability of the administrative state).
140
See OLC Opinion, supra note 11, at 24 (stating that the Executive cannot "effectively
rewrite the laws to match the Executive's policy preferences" and "cannot
abdicate ... statutory responsibilities under the guise of exercising enforcement discretion").
137
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tax laws, the EPA's enforcement of environmental laws, the DOJ's enforcement
of civil rights laws, the DOL's enforcement of labor laws, and the list goes on.
Accordingly, a limiting principle to the President's prosecutorial discretion
power is necessary.
Some have leapt from this sound observation to the unwarranted conclusion
that the President should not ever be permitted to exercise enforcement
discretion based on an independent assessment of the wisdom and public interest
in enforcement. 141 Indeed, a few commentators have taken the extreme position
that the Take Care Clause requires full enforcement and does not permit
executive nonenforcement discretion. 142 The majority of commentators,
however, agree that the executive power includes, at minimum, the ability to
decline to prosecute violations of federal law on a case-by-case basis relying
upon judgments about, inter alia, efficient allocation of limited resources and an
assessment of the strength of available evidence. 143 Some recent commentators,
however, question the authority of the Executive to rely upon his or her own
normative judgment regarding the public interest in prosecution and to institute
categorical prosecutorial discretion policies. 144 The attraction of these limits is
clear: categorical prosecutorial discretion policies most clearly raise the specter
of the President effectively usurping Congress's primary policy-making
function. 145 Yet upon closer scrutiny, neither limit is workable in all
circumstances.
It is not practically viable, legally defensible, or otherwise desirable to excise
independent
normative
judgments
from
prosecutorial
discretion
determinations. 146 To be sure, normative judgments regarding the wisdom,
equity, or public interest in enforcing a law can overlap significantly with the
legislature's judgment in framing and enacting the law. However, the idea that
the Executive's independent assessment of the public interest in prosecution can
or should be eliminated is at odds with both contemporary and historical practice
and cannot be supported by the legal foundations of prosecutorial discretion
authority .147 In deciding whether to initiate deportation proceedings against a

141

See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 784-85; Love & Garg, supra note 21, at

1206.
142

See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 785 (arguing that the "Take Care Clause
imposes on the President a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all
situations and cases").
143 See Andrias, supra note 16, at 1044; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 846; Love &
Garg, supra note 21, at 1216-17; Price supra note 15, at 706.
144 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 846; Love & Garg, supra note 21, at
1212; Price supra note 15, at 675.
145 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 137, at 322 ("In republican
government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.").
146 See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1662 (2010) (arguing that equitable prosecutorial
discretion decisions are inevitable and desirable).
147 See supra Part I.
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single parent, for example, few would take issue with a prosecutor's
consideration of the impact of deportation on the individual's children who are
U.S. citizens. Likewise, when prosecutors decide to forego prosecution of
certain marijuana cases to preserve resources for more prosecutions of
methamphetamines cases-presumably because they see the latter as more
dangerous to the public than the former-they exercise exactly the type of public
interest assessment that the public expects from prosecutors.
Similarly, the idea that prosecutorial discretion determinations must be made
solely on a case-by-case basis is in significant tension with the historical practice
of prosecutorial discretion. 148 Moreover, a prohibition on categorical
prosecutorial discretion policies would significantly undermine the institutional
design goals of transparency, political accountability, and uniforrnity. 149 As a
society, we expect top prosecutors to establish priorities and guidelines that
control the discretion of line-level prosecutors. 150 Only through transparent
public policies can we achieve consistent enforcement a~d political
accountability.
Thus, the Executive's normative judgment and power to enact categorical
policies cannot and should not be excised from prosecutorial discretion
decisions. This Article explores an alternative limiting principle that is based
upon the nature of the enforcement proceedings. Specifically, this Article
proposes that where proceedings can result in persons being taken into the
physical custody of the government and deprived of their freedom of movement,
the President enjoys the greatest power to decline to initiate enforcement
proceedings. Section III.C considers whether deportation proceedings fit within
this category.
As the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this realm is significantly
underdeveloped, there is little judicial guidance on the constitutional boundaries
of prosecutorial discretion power beyond the criminal context. 151 In the absence
of useful guidance from the courts, I return to the source to evaluate the limiting
principle proposed. The discussion begins with an examination of the textual
sources of prosecutorial discretion authority, and then attempts to contextualize
the various provisions through a structural analysis of the role of liberty
protection and prosecutorial discretion authority in the constitutional scheme.

A. Textual Sources ofProsecutorial Discretion Authority
The words "prosecutorial discretion" do not appear in the Constitution and no
single provision in the Constitution can be identified as the sole source of such
power. Instead, the power emanates from a variety of provisions, including

148

See supra notes 40-47, 57-64, 120-24 and accompanying text.
See Andrias, supra note 16, at 1038; Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 16, at 197.
150
Even those who generally argue against policy-based prosecutorial discretion concede
that "[s]ome degree of top-down direction ... seems appropriate." Price, supra note 16, at
758.
151
See supra notes 58-60, 68-88 and accompanying text.
149
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Article H's Take Care Clause, 152 Executive Vesting Clause, 153 and Pardon
Clause. 154 An analysis of each of these provisions is, therefore, a useful starting
point for the constitutional inquiry into the breadth of prosecutorial discretion
power.
1.

The Take Care Clause

The Constitution states that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." 155 This Clause is generally understood to stand for the most
basic premise taught in grade school civics classes: while it is Congress's
function to make the law and the Supreme Court's function to interpret that law,
it is the President's function to enforce the law. That is the constitutional system
of separation of powers at its most basic level.
Scholars and courts alike have observed that the language of the Take Care
Clause reads more naturally as a command than a grant of power and, thus, it is
counterintuitive to read the provision as a broad source of prosecutorial
discretion authority. 156 However, the Take Care Clause is nevertheless the
provision courts and scholars most commonly cite as a source of the President's
power to exercise prosecutorial discretion. 157 As the Supreme Court explained
in Heckler, "an agency's refusal to institute proceedings ... [is] a decision which
has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch,
inasmuch as it1s the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed. "' 158
In Buckley v. Valeo, 159 the Court had the opportunity to opine on the
connection between the Take Care Clause and prosecutorial discretion authority
in evaluating a wide-ranging challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act. 160
While the case is most well-known as part of the Court's jurisprudence on
campaign finance laws, one challenged provision of the Act related to the
enforcement authority of the Federal Election Commission. 161 A majority of the

152

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Id art. II, § 1.
154 Id art. II,§ 2. See generally In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d255, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2013)(citing
all three clauses as sources ofprosecutorial discretion authority).
155 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
156 See, e.g., Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524,613 (1838); WILLIAM RAWLE, A
VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 147-50 (2d ed. 1829); Cheh,
supra note 17, at 282; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 799.
157 E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,832 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13839 (1976); Andrias, supra note 16, at 1052-53; Price, supra note 15, at 697-98; see also The
Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482, 486 (1831) (citing the Take Care
Clause as a source of prosecutorial discretion "to save a party admitted to be innocent, from
a harassing and expensive litigation").
158 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
159 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
160 Id at 109.
161 Id. at 109-42.
153

518

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:489

Commission's members were appointed by Congress; however, the statute
authorized the Commission to initiate civil enforcement proceedings and
required the Attorney General, upon the Commission's request, to initiate
criminal enforcement proceedings-both traditional executive functions. 162
Likewise, "the decision not to seek judicial relief ... rest[ ed] solely with the
Commission." 163 The Court held that the delegation of this executive
enforcement discretion-including the power to decline to initiate
proceedings-to a congressionally controlled commission was impermissible;
the Court explained that "it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the
Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. "'164
The history surrounding the drafting of the Take Care Clause adds some
limited additional guidance for identifying the constitutional limiting principle I
seek. 165 The earliest iteration of the Take Care Clause can be found in The
Virginia Plan authored by Madison at the inception of the Constitutional
Convention. Therein, Madison described an "Executive" with the ''power to
carry into effect the national laws." 166 A later draft of the Clause introduced at
the Convention stated that "[i]t shall be [the Executive's] duty to provide for the
due & faithful exec-of the Laws." 167 The Committee of Detail and the
Committee of Style refined the wording to arrive at the final text. 168 While there
is no clear explanation for the transition from the "general authority"
construction originally proposed by Madison to the "duty" construction in the
final text, one of the authors of the revised duty language, future Supreme Court
Justice James Wilson, was clear in his vision that the Clause was intended to
impose a limit on presidential power. He explained that the President has
"authority, not to make, or alter, or dispense with the laws, but to execute and
act the laws, which [are] established." 169
Thus, while the Take Care Clause is generally understood as a source of
prosecutorial discretion power, the text, jurisprudence, and framin~history do
little to define the boundaries of that power. It is clear that the Clause empowers
the · President to exercise enforcement discretion, but it also imposes an

162

Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 111.
164
Id at 138 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3).
165
See generally Price, supra note 15, at 692-94 (reciting the history of the Take Care
Clause and its relation to the English suspension and dispensing powers).
166
MAxFARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES app. at 226
(1913) (emphasis added).
167
RECORDS, supra note 48, at 171 (emphasis added).
168
See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 802 (quoting RECORDS,supra note 48, at 185,
600).
169
2 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law Part 2, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
827, 878 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra
note 15, at 802; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (1994).
163
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obligation to see that laws, as a general matter, are executed consistent with
Congress's dictates. Given these considerations, an appropriate constitutional
limiting principle must take full account of both the enforcement discretion
authority the Clause bestows on the President, and the limit the Clause imposes
on the President to prevent usurpation of the legislative function.
2.

The Executive Vesting Clause

The very first s,entence of Article II of the U.S. Constitution declares that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." 170 However, the Constitution provides no precise definition of the
executive power. Nevertheless, like the Take Care Clause, the Executive Vesting
Clause has also been cited as a source of the President's authority to exercise
enforcement discretion. 171
There is, however, a robust debate in the literature about whether the
Executive Vesting Clause is a source of implied powers at all. 172 Some scholars
have argued that the Clause does not convey any implied powers but rather is
intended to frame Article II and make clear that the powers enumerated therein
shall be wielded by a unitary executive: the President. 173 Others see the Clause
as the source of significant implied powers that reach beyond those otherwise
enumerated. 174 Entry into this developed debate is well beyond the scope of this
Article. Whether or not the Clause conveys implied powers, the Clause is, if
nothing more, an explicit source of the President's power to execute or enforce
the law. 175 As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he vesting of the executive

170

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-43 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
695 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
172 For an excellent survey of this debate, see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty,
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 546-49 (2004).
173 See, e.g., Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The
Intent ofthe Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 599-601 (1974);
Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 172, at 551; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power ofthe
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1993).
174 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 15, at 800 ("The Vesting Clause is, indeed, a
broad grant of power, comparable to those for Congress and the federal judiciary.");
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive:
A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1685-87 (2005) (asserting that the Founding Fathers
intended all executive power not explicitly granted to other branches to reside in the
Executive); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 133, 210-19 (1998) (arguing that an expansive understanding of the Vesting Clause
resolves the Constitution's failure to allocate certain foreign policy powers).
175 Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 172, at 553 ("Indeed, to the extent that there are any
Founding statements ascribing substantive content to the Article II Vesting Clause, they are
all statements equating executive power with the power to execute the laws."); see also
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189,202 (1928) ("Legislative power, as distinguished
from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the
171
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power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the
laws." 176 As discussed below, an important component of that power is the
authority to exercise discretion regarding when to initiate and when to forego
enforcement action.
Courts have had the opportunity to expound on the nature of the executive
power to enforce the laws in situations where Congress has attempted to insert
itself into enforcement functions or vest enforcement functions in an entity
outside of the control of the President. 177 In Morrison v. Olson, the Court
considered a challenge to the enforcement authority of an independent counsel
appointed pursuant to the provisions of the Ethics and Government Act. 178 Under
the Act, the Attorney General, and through her, the President, had control over
the decision to seek the appointment of an independent counsel, determine the
scope of her appointment, and effect her removal for good cause. However, once
appointed, the independent counsel exercised significant autonomy of
prosecutorial discretion. 179 The question thus arose whether, in depriving the
President of full control over prosecutorial-discretion decisions, the Act
"violate[d] the principle of separation of powers by unduly interfering with the
role of the Executive Branch." 180 Ultimately, the Court held that because
Congress was not assuming for itself control over prosecutorial discretion and
because the President, through the Attorney General, exercised a significant
"degree of control over the power to initiate an investigation by the independent
counsel," the Act did not impermissibly divest the President of his executive
power. 181 Morrison is important for our inquiry, however, because the Court was
clear in its vision that prosecutorial discretion authority falls squarely within the
executive power. 182 Justice Scalia made this point explicitly in his dissent,
though he pointed out that he was in agreement with the majority on this point. 183
In evaluating the scope of the "executive power," specifically in reference to the

agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions."). As
James Madison explained on the floor of the First Congress, "if any power whatsoever is in
its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who
execute the laws." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (emphasis added).
176
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). But see Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is
Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers' Intent, 99 YALE
L.J. 1069, 1070 (1990) ("(T]he Framers did not intend prosecution to be a core executive
function .... ").
177
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483
(2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-77 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13839 (1976).
178
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659 ("This case presents us with a challenge to the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 .... ").
179
Id. at 662-63.
180 Id. at 693.
181 Id. at 695-96.
182 Id at 691.
183 Id. at 702 n. l (Scalia, J., dissenting).

2017]

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AT ITS ZENITH

521

Executive Vesting Clause, he explained that a core component of that power is
"prosecutorial discretion," which he described as "the balancing of innumerable
legal and practical considerations."184
Similarly in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,
the Court considered a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 185 which
vested certain prosecutorial discretion functions in a board responsible for
creating and enforcing rules for the accounting industry. 186 The board was a
nonprofit corporation, with members who were not considered government
officers or employees. 187 Because the board members could not be removed by
the President, or even by anyone directly accountable to the President, the Court
held the Act impermissibly infringed on the President's constitutional
enforcement discretion and was thus "contrary to Article H's vesting of the
executive power in the President." 188
Ultimately, the Vesting Clause language, history, and jurisprudence are useful
to supplement our understanding of the Take Care Clause, insofar as the Vesting
Clause unequivocally is phrased in terms of an affirmative power grant, which
has been interpreted to include the power to exercise enforcement discretion.
Again, however, the boundaries of that discretion are difficult to discern through
the Vesting or Take Care Clauses alone.
3.

The Pardon Clause

The Pardon Clause states that the President "shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases
oflmpeachment." 189 A "pardon" is generally understood to excuse an offender's
crime, while a "reprieve" delays or mitigates the punishment for a criminal
offense. 190 A pardon is a greater benefit than a grant of prosecutorial discretion;
the former is permanent and relieves an offender of punishment and the future
threat thereof, while the latter is wholly revocable. Nevertheless, the greater
pardon power has been construed to include the lesser prosecutorial discretion
power. 191

184

Id. at 708.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 750-71 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
186 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
187 Id. at 484.
188 Id. at 492, 496.
189
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
190 Price, supra note 15, at 698.
191 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,380 (1866) (indicating that the President's
pardon power "may be exercised at any time after [a crime's] commission, either before legal
proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment"); In re
Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 225, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("But the President has clear constitutional
authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion to decline to prosecute violators of such laws,
just as the President indisputably has clear constitutional authority to pardon violators of such
laws."); The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482,486 (1831) ("[T]he
185
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Courts and scholars have generally taken an expansive view of the President's
pardon power. 192 Under the Pardon Clause, courts have held that the President
has the power to act "at any time after [a crime's] commission, either before
legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and
judgment." 193 The pardon power has been interpreted to include the power to
commute sentences and to impose conditions on a pardon or commutation, even
when such conditions are not contemplated by statute. 194 The Court has also
been clear that the pardon power "cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished
by the Congress." 195 The broad pardon power is both reflective of and a source
of the absolute prosecutorial discretion afforded to the President in criminal
cases. 196
Notably for our purposes, the pardon power has been consistently interpreted
since the early days of the Union to include the power to grant broad categorical
amnesties from prosecution upon the President's unilateral determination that
such amnesties were in the public interest. 197 The Supreme Court has been
consistent and apparently untroubled by the extension of the pardon power to
categorical amnesties. 198 Scholars have likewise recognized that the pardon
power encompasses the power to grant broad amnesties. 199 The power is far from

power to grant a nolle prosequi in such a case, is necessarily embraced in the power to pardon
an offender."); Cheh, supra note 17, at 282 ("The idea is that, because the president has
unbounded constitutional discretion to grant pardons ... he may exercise unbounded
prosecutorial discretion not to bring a case since the same result could be achieved via the
pardon power.").
192 See, e.g., Price, supra note 15, at 698; see also KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS:
JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 217 (1989); Duker, supra note 52 at 535.
193 See Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380.
194 Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256,264 (1974); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307,309
(1855).
195. Schick, 419 U.S. at 266.
196 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("[T]he Executive Branch has
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case." (emphasis
added)); see also Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that the
Attorney General, as an agent of the President, has absolute discretion "in choosing whether
to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution already started"); United States
v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (stating that the Attorney General exercises his
prosecutorial discretion as a function of the executive power).
197 JOHN M. MATHEWS, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 168 (1932) (stating that
the President can issue amnesty proclamations); see also Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the
Federal Clemency Power, 79 Tux. L. REV. 561, 588-90 (2001) (providing several examples
of presidents' use of the pardon power to bring civil tranquility and prevent rebellion).
198 See Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 156 (1871) (holding that the
post-Civil War presidential amnesty "was a public act of which all courts of the United States
are bound to take notice, and to which all courts are bound to give effect"); see also Knote v.
United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147
(1871).
199 See, e.g., Duker, supra note 52, at 519; Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality ofMercy Strained:
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theoretical. As discussed in Part I, it has been exercised repeatedly since the
early days of the Union and into modem times by some of our nation's most
iconic presidents. 200 But for the criminal designation, it is hard to find a
distinction between the power asserted by these presidents and the power
asserted by President Obama through his creation of the DACA and DAPA
programs. They all involve a categorical policy decision not to enforce a
properly enacted statute against a broad class of offenders because of the
President's normative judgment regarding the public interest, or lack thereof, in
such prosecutions.
The criminal distinction is potentially critical insofar as the amnesties in the
criminal context have been justified by the pardon power, which has generally
been viewed as extending only to criminal matters. However, nothing in the
plain language of the Clause limits pardons to the criminal context. Rather, the
pardon power extends to "Offenses against the United States."201 Despite the
popular conception that the pardon power applies only to criminal matters, the
limited authority available interpreting the phrase "Offenses against the United
States" suggests some applications beyond the criminal context. Indeed, a
comprehensive review recently undertaken of the historical practices in England
and the colonies, records from the Constitutional Convention, and English
common law strongly supports an understand of the pardon power that is broad
enough to reach civil offenses against the United States.202
While the Supreme Court has frequently remarked in dicta that the pardon
power pertains to criminal proceedings,203 only twice has it specifically
considered the application of the power beyond the criminal context, each time
reading the Clause to reach beyond its traditional criminal boundaries. 204 In Ex
parte Grossman, the Court was confronted with the question of whether a

Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 577 (1991); MOORE,
supra note 192, at 5.
200
See supra notes 37-38, 57-64, 119-26 and accompanying text.
201
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
202 Noah A. Messing, A New Power?: Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency, 64 BUFF.
L. REV. 661, 663 (2016); see also 3 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 38:27
(3d ed. 2011) ("The pardoning power extends not only to felonies and misdemeanors with
imprisonment but also to the remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures. The power to
pardon should not be limited by distinctions between 'civil' and 'criminal' penalties; property
which has been seized by the government can be restored so long as third-party interests in
the property have not vested."); Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President's Conditional
Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1673 (2001) ("[T]he [Pardon] Clause covers civil as
well as criminal sanctions imposed by the federal government."); Saikrishna Prakash, The
ChiefProsecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521,582 n.356 (2005) (concluding that the pardon
power extends to civil offenses); Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case
Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 780 n.10 (1996) ("A pardon can
release the offender from civil liability as to the federal government .... ").
203
See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256,260 (1974); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
204 Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925); The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1885).
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presidential pardon could operate to relieve an individual of incarceration
ordered by a court pursuant to a contempt finding. 205 The district court had
issued an injunction against the petitioner prohibiting him from selling alcohol
in violation of federal law. Upon violation of that order, the court held the
petitioner in contempt and ordered him imprisoned for a period of one year and
ordered him to pay a fine of $1000. Thereafter, the President issued a pardon
commuting the sentence to the fine alone, which was paid. Nevertheless, the
district court ordered the petitioner remanded to serve the period of incarceration
on the theory that the pardon power did not extend to contempt findings because
"Offenses," as used in the Pardon Clause, only extends to "crimes and
misdemeanors."206
The Court held that the President was acting within his powers under the
Pardon Clause. The Court specifically held that "the term 'offences"' as used in
the Pardon Clause is "more comprehensive ... than are the terms 'crimes' and
'criminal prosecutions."'207 The contempt order in Grossman was technically
classified as "criminal" rather than "civil" contempt, but the Court was clear that
it was not criminal in the sense of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because no
right to jury attached, nor did other constitutional criminal procedure
protections. 208 The civil versus criminal distinction in the contempt context
rested on the question of whether the penalty imposed was intended to vindicate
the rights of the state, the dignity of the court so to speak, or the rights of a
private party. The former were designated as criminal contempt and the latter as
civil contempt.
Critical to the Court's analysis was its holding that the scope of the pardon
power was coextensive with the scope of the King's prerogative at the time of
the framing. 209 The Court observed that the pardon power in England had
extended to contempt orders that sought to vindicate wrongs against the state,
but not to contempt orders aimed at delivering justice and restitution to private
individuals. 210 Thus, the reach of the pardon power, the Court held, turned not
on the criminal designation but on whether the offense was properly considered

205
206

207
20s
209

Grossman, 267 U.S. at 88-89.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 117-18 (citing Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1904)).
Id.

Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833)) ("As this
power had been exercised, from time immemorial, by the executive of that nation whose
language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we
adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books
for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail
himself of it."); see also Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 309 (1855) ("[The pardon
power] is said to be the exercise of prerogative, such as the king of England has in such
cases .... ").
210
Grossman, 267 U.S. at 110; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 847-48 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Duker, supra note 52, at 486.
·
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an offense against the state rather than a dispute between private parties. 211 In its
analysis, the Court explicitly recognized that such pardons, even for offenses
against the state, can infringe on the power of the coordinate branches of
government. Nevertheless, the Court explained that that was the balance the
Constitution struck as a fail-safe protection against unjust deprivations of
liberty.212
Several decades earlier, the Supreme Court considered the case of The
Laura,213 wherein a private citizen had filed suit against a steamboat operator
seeking statutory damages imposed on such operators for exceeding its
permissible passenger load. 214 The statute, however, made the private right of
action secondary to an action in the name of the United States and also permitted
the Secretary of the Treasury, in his discretion, to absolve any violating carrier
of the liability imposed by statute. After the Secretary granted such absolution,
the case was dismissed and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that Congress violated
the Constitution by delegating to the Secretary the exclusive right of the
President to issue reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States.
In its analysis, the Court accepted that pardon power would permit the President
to absolve the carrier of civil liability for the cause of action held by the United
States but rejected that the power was exclusive to the President, instead holding
that Congress too could grant such relief. 215
The conclusion that the pardon power extends beyond criminal offenses
comports with the authoritative accounts of the historical exercise of the King's
prerogative. Indeed, applying the Supreme Court's holding that the President's
pardon power is coextensive with the pardon power of the King at the time of
the Founding leads to an abundance of evidence of civil pardon power. While
the criminal-civil divide was not well established at the time of the framing, 216
there is, nevertheless, an ''unbroken line of kings and queens [who] pardoned
offenses that would almost undoubtedly be civil today."217 At common law, the
pardon power was limited not by the criminal designation but by the principle
that the Executive had full discretion to relieve an individual of penalties for
offenses against the Crown but had no power to pardon individuals as a
mechailism to interfere with disputes between private parties. 218 Thus, the
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Grossman, 261 U.S. at 110; Wells, 59 U.S. at 312.
Grossman, 261 U.S at 120-21; see also Power of the President to Remit Fines Against
Defaulting Jurors, 4 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 458,461 (1845).
213
114 U.S. 411 (1885)
214
Id. at 411-12.
215
Id. at 413-14.
216
Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and
Punish ... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARYL. REV. 447, 511-12
(2000); see also Peter Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated
Approach to Understanding the Nature ofImmigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 289, 320-28 (2008).
217
Messing, supra note 202, at 689.
218
Id. at 694; see also In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Osborn v.
212
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historical record establishes that, in the lead up to the founding of the
Constitution, English kings pardoned fines and tariffs for a wide variety of
noncriminal violations, including land use violation, import-export violation, tax
violation, among others. 219 Given the Supreme Court's holding that the pardon
power is identical to the corresponding power exercised by English kings at
common law, this historical evidence lends strong additional support to the
conclusion that the pardon power can reach civil offenses. So too does the
practice of presidents, who have, without significant attention, issued pardons
for civil offense many times throughout our nation's history. 220
Thus, the Supreme Court has squarely held in Grossman that the pardon
power could be used to protect the liberty of individuals in the context of
noncriminal offenses against the federal government. In dicta, in The Laura, the
Court again affirmed the use of pardons in noncriminal contexts.221 The
historical evidence, which the Court has treated as paramount, strongly indicates
that a pardon may be extended to at least some civil offenses. The Court,
likewise, has recognized that the pardon power includes the power to grant broad
amnesties based on the President's unilateral normative judgment. This
jurisprudence suggests that the pardon power may extend to modem
administrative proceedings that involve offenses against the state, at least insofar
as the offense implicates significant liberty interests.
However, the limitation of this authority must be recognized insofar as both
cases arose before the New Deal and before the birth of the modem
administrative state. The Court in these decisions therefore could not have
foreseen the full modem separation of powers implications of extending the
power beyond the criminal realm. 222 But regardless of whether a pardon can
formally operate in such proceedings, insofar as the Clause is an established
source of presidential authority to grant broad categorical amnesties, and insofar
as its operation is not strictly limited to criminal proceedings, the Pardon Clause
jurisprudence can, at minimum, help inform our understanding of the nature of
prosecutorial discretion power in the administrative arena. Specifically, the

United States, 91 U.S. 474,477 (1875)); Duker, supra note 52, at 486; cf Milwaukee Cty. v.
M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1935) (holding that outside the pardon context a civil
suit was an "offense[] against the United States"). State courts, in interpreting their
constitutions' pardon powers, have come to similar conclusions about the powers'
extracriminal reach. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 17 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Mass. 1938);
State ex rel. Van Orden v. Sauvinet, 24 La. Ann. 119, 121 (La. 1872).
219
Messing, supra note 202, at 690; see also id. at 694-98 (citing common law cases
approving the use of civil pardons).
220
Id. at 719-23 (describing how Presidents Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, and
Franklin Roosevelt used the pardon power to pardon offenses that would be considered civil
in modern times).
221
The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1885) ("[T]he President, under the general,
unqualified grant of power to pardon offences against the United States, may remit fines,
penalties, and forfeitures of every description arising under the laws of Congress ....").
222
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has continued to cite Grossman in the modern
era. See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974).
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Pardon Clause jurisprudence suggests that the President may enjoy heightened
prosecutorial discretion powers beyond the criminal realm in administrative
proceedings which are closely tied to the historic roots of the Pardon Clause.
The two primary textual sources of the President's generalized prosecutorial
discretion authority-the Take Care and Executive Vesting Clauses-help us
identify the tension between the President's duty to carry out the constitutionally
enacted laws and his power to exercise independent discretion in enforcing the
laws. However, these provisions do little to help us identify a workable limiting
principle that can hold true to these sometimes competing constitutional goals.
The jurisprudence regarding the Pardon Clause, however, helps move the
inquiry forward insofar as it makes clear that there are certain categories of
enforcement where the Constitution places a thumb on the scale of Presidential
power and, conversely, the legislature's power is more limited. In short, the
Pardon Clause jurisprudence suggests additional prosecutorial discretion
authority when the enforcement proceedings relate to offenses against the state,
rather than to disputes between private actors, and makes clear that the
constitutional order permits unilateral power to deliver mercy but not
punishment. Thus, the jurisprudence regarding the textual sources of
prosecutorial discretion power suggests that the quest in the existing scholarship
to identify a single appropriate limiting principle is misguided. The structural
constitutional analysis below seeks to further explore the boundary of
heightened power suggested by the Pardon Clause.
B. Structural Constitutional Analysis
The conventional wisdom is sound that the President may not generally, as a
result of policy disagreements with Congress, direct administrative agencies to
stop enforcing statutes against broad categories of potential offenders.223 But the
history and jurisprudence discussed above demonstrate that, in at least some
limited contexts, broad categorical prosecutorial discretion policies have played
an important role in federal policy making. This Section further explores the
potential limiting principle for heightened prosecutorial discretion suggested by
the Pardon Clause. Namely, I consider the implications of cabining heightened
prosecutorial discretion powers to the limited category of federal enforcement
proceedings that relate to offenses against the state and that implicate significant
liberty interests. Specifically, this Section evaluates the limiting principle with
reference to the values that underlie the separation of powers doctrine and the
structural bias against liberty deprivation built into the Constitution. In addition,
this Section considers how this limiting principle interacts with the tenet that
prosecutorial discretion may not generally be used to undermine vested private
rights. Finally, this Section further considers the implications of the limiting
principle through the lens of participatory democratic theory, before turning to
the practical constraints this potential limiting principle can impose on
presidential policy making in Part III.
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See Andrias, supra note 16, at 1113.
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The Constitutional Bias Against Liberty Deprivation

The question of how much prosecutorial discretion a president should have is
first and foremost a question of the proper separation of powers between
Congress and the President. In evaluating this issue, one must start by examining
the purpose behind that separation of powers. There are few points where the
intent of the Framers is as clear. As Justice Jackson explained in his famous
concurring opinion in Youngstown, "the Constitution diffuses power the better
to secure liberty."224 Madison made the same point emphatically in Federalist
4 7, wherein he sought to articulate the justification for the separation of powers
between the three branches:
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim [of separation of
powers] are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative
and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he,
"there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a
tyrannical manner."225
While political theorists generally agree that the system of separation of
powers was envisioned primarily as a "prerequisite for civil liberty,"226 political
liberty as well as physical liberty was surely encompassed in this vision. 227
Moreover, property protection is also clearly a central value in the constitutional
order. 228 How then does the constitutional structure support the notion of

224 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) ("The Framers' inherent
distrust of governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that
allocated powers among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make
Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty."); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth.
v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252,272 (1991) ("The ultimate
purpose of this separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed.");
Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 153638, 137 n.102 (1991) (describing the historical context and rationale for the structural
protection of individual rights adopted by the Framers); Harold J. Krent, Separating the
Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1259-60 (1988)
(describing how the constitutional system of checks and balances was designed "as a means
of protecting individual liberty from arbitrary governance"); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 578 (1984) (describing how checks and balances and the separation of powers were
designed "to protect the citizens from the emergence of tyrannical government").
225 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961); see also
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 182 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., 1900)
(1748).
226 Brown, supra note 224, at 1533 (quoting w. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS 11 (1965)).
221 Id.
228 Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 (1972) ("It cannot be doubted that
among the civil rights intended to be protected from discriminatory state action by the
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enhanced discretion solely for the protection of physical liberty? First,
notwithstanding the value placed on property in the Constitution generally, in
the context of separation of powers theory and jurisprudence, liberty protection,
more than property preservation, is the primary consideration.229 Thus, insofar
as the robust prosecutorial discretion is viewed as primarily a separation of
powers issue, a focus on liberty protection is warranted.
Second, while the Constitution secures many varieties of liberty, a review of
the due process jurisprudence demonstrates that not all liberty interests receive
the same level of protection. The Constitution reserves the greatest procedural
protections for those at risk of losing their physical liberty. 230 The Supreme
Court has not only extended a panoply of special procedural protections when
physical liberty is at issue, but it has also characterized the deprivation of
physical liberty as being "at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause,"231 "the most elemental of liberty interests,"232 "a massive curtailment
of liberty,"233 and an "interest of immense importance" and "transcending
value."234 Modem jurisprudence demonstrates that creating special protections

Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality
in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers of that Amendment as an
essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the
Amendment was intended to guarantee." (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10
(1948))).
229 Brown, supra note 224, at 1533 ("On the American side of the Atlantic the primary
impetus for separated powers was the establishment and maintenance of political liberty.").
230 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1983) (noting that "commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty" and requiring clear and
convincing evidence of dangerousness to confine a mentally ill individual (citations omitted));
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("The pre-eminent generalization that
emerges from this .Court's precedents on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is that such
a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty ifhe
loses the litigation."); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 497 (1980) (requiring that qualified and
independent assistance must be provided to an inmate who is threatened with involuntary
transfer to a state mental hospital); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (holding
that a state must bear the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on facts that can trigger
a more lengthy deprivation of physical liberty); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364,368 (1970)
(clarifying the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for individuals faced with
criminal incarceration and extending the rule to juveniles facing physical liberty deprivations
in juvenile delinquency proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35-42 (1967) (holding that due
process requires the State to pay for representation by counsel in a civil "juvenile
delinquency" proceeding that could lead to incarceration).
231 Turnerv. Rogers, 563 U.S. 431,445 (201l)(quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
80 (1992)) (evaluating detention pursuant to contempt proceedings).
232 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (evaluating detention of military
detainees).
233 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (evaluating detention of sex offenders).
234 Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64 (evaluating detention of juvenile delinquents).
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against unwarranted liberty deprivations is entirely consistent with the
constitutional scheme.
As Judge Cavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit explained:
The Executive's broad prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers
illustrate a key point of the Constitution's separation of powers. One of the
greatest unilateral powers a President possesses under the Constitution, at
least in the domestic sphere, is the power to protect individual liberty by
essentially under-enforcing federal statutes regulating private
behavior .... [T]he President's prosecutorial discretion and pardon
powers operate as an independent protection for individual citizens against
the enforcement of oppressive laws that Congress may have passed ....235
Nevertheless, a robust vision of prosecutorial discretion, even confined to the
liberty deprivation context, undeniably can come at a significant cost to
congressional power. An organizing principle of separation of powers
jurisprudence has always been to guard against the aggrandizement of one
branch of government at the expense of the power of another. 236 However, it
somewhat misses the mark to characterize the President's power to unilaterally
prevent liberty deprivation through inaction as presidential aggrandizement visa-vis Congress. In fact, the constitutional scheme reserves precisely the same
unilateral power for Congress to prevent liberty deprivations. The Due Process
Clause ensures that the President may not deprive a person of liberty except
pursuant to the law as set forth by Congress. Through inaction, the decision not
to pass such a law, Congress could therefore also prevent liberty deprivation.
Thus, the presidential power to prevent liberty deprivation must be viewed
alongside the congressional power to prevent liberty deprivation through
lawmaking and the judicial power to prevent liberty deprivation through habeas
review. Rather than aggrandizing one branch above the others, the unilateral
power of each branch to prevent liberty deprivation reflects a constitutional
structural bias against liberty deprivation in general. 237

235

In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951 (1983) ("The Constitution sought to divide
the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories,
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of
government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 122 (1976) ("The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the
tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James
Madison), supra note 137, at 321-22 (describing how the separation of powers works to
prevent power from gradually becoming concentrated in one part of the government).
237 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation ofPowers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1017 (2006) (explaining the effective veto power of each branch to prevent liberty deprivation
in the criminal context); cf In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003)
("Paradoxically, the plenary prosecutorial power of the executive branch safeguards liberty,
for, in conjunction with the plenary legislative power of Congress, it assures that no one can
be convicted of a crime without the concurrence of all three branches ....").
236
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Another concern: regarding robust prosecutorial discretion power relates to
the fact that our system of lawmaking has a built-in bias toward inaction-a
reality that is hard to escape in the context of today's congressional gridlock. 238
Some have argued that, in light of the bias toward inaction, a robust vision of
prosecutorial discretion power is especially problematic.239 Insofar as it is
extremely difficult to make laws in the first place, they argue that allowing a
president to refuse to enforce, or fully enforce, a properly enacted law creates
too great a bias toward inaction and thus too great a tendency toward effective
deregulation.
In the narrow confines of the liberty deprivation context, however, the
Constitution does precisely what these scholars identify as generally inconsistent
with the constitutional scheme. The Constitution imposes several additional
hurdles and safeguards against government action that can result in liberty
deprivation. Several provisions of the Constitution impose special obstacles
when government action involves the deprivation of physical liberty. The
Suspension Clause dictates that, unlike most other contexts, the judiciary cannot
be deprived of the opportunity to review the legality of deprivations of physical
liberty. 240 The Bill of Attainder Clause limits the ability of the legislature to
directly dictate the deprivation of an individual's liberty. 241 Likewise, the Pardon
Clause gives the President the unique power to prevent the deprivation of
liberty. 242 And, of course, there are a host of additional protections against
unwarranted liberty depri~ations in criminal proceedings.243 Not all of these
provisions are strictly limited to the liberty deprivation context, but the unifying
theme and the central danger against which these provisions guard is the danger
of unwarranted physical liberty deprivation. Collectively, these provisions
demonstrate that, notwithstanding the general hurdles to lawmaking, the
constitutional order includes many additional fail-safe mechanisms when it
comes to federal action that can result in the deprivation of physical liberty.
Thus, where prosecutorial discretion operates as a one-way ratchet against
liberty deprivation, the foundational concern that underlies the system of
separation of powers is not offended. Heightened prosecutorial discretion in this
realm is also consistent with the constitutional scheme that includes several
additional checks against government action in the liberty deprivation context.
In contrast, a robust vision of prosecutorial discretion across all administrative
contexts, which allows broad inaction based on policy disagreements with
Congress would also act as a one-way ratchet. However, this vision would not
specifically be in favor ofliberty but rather in favor of a generalized deregulation
238

See, e.g., Price supra note 15, at 686-87.
See Love & Garg, supra note 21, at 1200-01.
240 U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 9, cl. 2; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001).
241 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
242 See supra Section 11.A.3.
243 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (granting the right to a grand jury, protection against
double jeopardy, and the right against self-incrimination); id. amend. VI (granting the right to
a speedy trial, the right to a trial by jury, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to
counsel).
239
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bias. That bias finds no support in the structure of the Constitution. In addition
to the structure and foundational features, modern due process jurisprudence
also demonstrates the unique protections the Constitution affords when physical
liberty is at stake. Collectively, the foundational purpose of the separation of
powers, the unique structural checks against liberty deprivation in the
Constitution, and the modern case law reserving the greatest process protection
when physical liberty is at stake all evince a constitutional scheme that militate
in favor of the most robust protections against the deprivation of physical liberty.
2.

Public Offenses Versus Interference with Private Rights

Insofar as the President derives some aspects of any heightened prosecutorial
discretion authority from the Pardon Clause, it is important to consider the
distinction in the Pardon Clause jurisprudence between offenses against the state
and the disruption of private rights. 244 In some sense, all administrative and
criminal proceedings can be understood as offenses against the state. There are
always important societal interests at play, which is why society invests in
establishing these enforcement systems. Society as a whole has a strong interest
in the enforcement of labor, immigration, civil rights, securities, and criminal
laws. Conversely, government enforcement proceedings always have some
collateral impact on private rights (beyond the obvious private rights of the
subject of the enforcement proceedings). In labor law, prosecutorial discretion
decisions can impact the private rights of employers and employees. In civil
rights law, prosecutorial discretion decisions can impact the private rights of
potential victims of civil rights as well as potential rights violators. In criminal
law, prosecutorial discretion decisions can similarly be conceived of as
impacting the rights of victims and perpetrators.
In the context of the modern administrative state, how then do we give
meaning to the principle that the pardon power, and the derivative aspects of the
prosecutorial discretion power, extend only to "offenses against the United
States" and may not be used to interfere in private disputes?245 In its clearest
form, a criminal prosecution for treason is an offense against the United States.
Notwithstanding the potential presence of individualized victims, it is a wellestablished principle of criminal law that, as a formal matter, the rights being
vindicated in criminal proceedings are societal, not individual, rights. 246 While
a victim of a crime may have an individual civil cause of action against a
criminal defendant, the public decision whether or not to prosecute that
individual does not disrupt that right. On the other hand, the use of prosecutorial
discretion to interfere in a private tort dispute, for example, would be a clear
example of an impermissible use of the power to directly interfere with a private
right. It is clear that the President could not generally use his enforcement
discretion to direct the termination of a private civil law suit.

244
245
246

See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 847-48 (1985) (Marshall, J. concurring).
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I start from the premise that all public enforcement proceedings involve some
degree of public interest and some degree of private interest. If we think about
the potentially competing public and private interests as a sliding scale, we
would expect that, as the balance tips more toward the public interest, the
President's prosecutorial discretion power would be greater. If the primary
interest belongs to the government, on behalf of the people, the government
should be free to forego enforcement to vindicate that interest at its discretion.
Conversely, when the balance tips more toward a private interest, we would
expect the President's power to diminish.
The line drawing is a difficult task. However, there are certain categories of
federal enforcement proceedings where the balance tips more in favor of the
public interest, where the formal interest at stake in the proceedings is societal,
not individual, and where the result of the proceedings cannot avoid directly
harming the private rights of persons who are not parties to the proceedings. In
contrast, there are certain categories of federal enforcement proceedings that
more closely resemble the rights at stake in private tort disputes than the public
interest in treason prosecutions. Such proceedings are brought by the
government primarily to vindicate the rights of specific individuals, or distinct
groups of individuals, and the proceedings can have a direct impact on the
private rights of nonparties to the proceedings. Again, insofar as the Pardon
Clause is a source of heightened prosecutorial discretion authority, such power
should be greater in regard to those proceedings that fall into the former group
and lesser in those proceedings that fall into the latter group.
Notably, for this Article's purposes, enforcement proceedings that implicate
the deprivation of physical liberty universally fall into the former group, where
the public interest is paramount. The decision of the President to initiate or not
initiate proceedings that could result in criminal incarceration, deportation, or
military internment, for example, are formally designed to vindicate a general
societal interest and cannot directly impact the private legal rights of nonparties.
In contrast, there are certain administrative proceedings that are initiated
primarily to vindicate particularized private interests and where the outcome of
the proceedings can directly impact the legal rights of nonparties. The SEC may
enforce securities laws on behalf of shareholders against a company, and the
outcome of those proceedings can directly impact the legal rights of such
shareholders. The DOL may enforce labor laws on behalf of employees against
an employer, and the outcome of those proceedings can directly impact the legal
rights of such employees. The DOJ may enforce civil rights laws on behalf of
aggrieved individuals against a state or private entity, and the outcome of those
proceedings can directly impact the legal rights of such aggrieved individuals.
In these instances, inaction, as much as action, means the federal government is
choosing sides in a private dispute. Choosing not to act-and not to initiate
enforcement proceedings-puts the federal government on the side of the
regulated entity. Choosing to act-and initiate enforcement proceedings-puts
the federal government on the side of the intended beneficiary of the regulation.
Justice Marshall spoke to this distinction in his concurrence in Heckler:
Criminal prosecutorial decisions vindicate only intangible interests,
common to society as a whole, in the enforcement of the criminal law. The
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conduct at issue has already occurred; all that remains is society's general
interest in assuring that the guilty are punished. In contrast, requests for
administrative enforcement typically seek [to remedy] ... injuries [that]
often run to specific classes of individuals whom Congress has singled out
as statutory beneficiaries. 247
Though Justice Marshall drew a line between criminal and administrative
enforcement, what he identified as unique and important about criminal
enforcement that justifies the heightened discretion can be applied with equal
force to administrative enforcement that threatens physical liberty. They are both
post hoc enforcement proceedings that seek to vindicate society's general
interest (as opposed to settling disputes between various private interests) and
can result in a significant deprivation of liberty. He concluded by noting that
"[t]o the extent arguments about traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion
have any force at all in [the administrative] context, they ought to apply only to
an agency's decision to decline to seek penalties against an individual for past
conduct. " 248
There are some administrative enforcement schemes that do not implicate
physical liberty but nevertheless may be conceived of as targeting offenses
against society as a whole. Environmental enforcement and tax enforcement
may fall into this category. Thus, while enforcement actions that implicate
physical liberty are universally offenses against the state, offenses against the
state do not universally implicate physical liberty interests. One can think of
these two factors as separate-as offenses against the state and offenses that can
trigger liberty deprivation-each militating in favor of more robust prosecutorial
discretion powers. When both factors are present, we would expect the
discretion to be at its height. 249
3.

Democratic Participatory Theory Considerations

A separate factor to be considered is how the scope of prosecutorial discretion
authority should be informed by participatory democratic dynamics. 250 Outside

247

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 849-50.
249 Relatedly, in assessing the potential danger ofrobust prosecutorial discretion powers,
some have argued it is the functional equivalent of unilateral presidential lawmaking because
"inaction and action are two sides of the same coin: any refusal to act may quickly be recast
as a decision to do something.... Inaction, in short, is no different from action in any
fundamental, constitutional sense." Love & Garg, supra note 21, at 1205. However, while the
distinction between inaction and action can be illusory at times, there is nothing abstract or
subtle about the distinction between the affirmative act of locking someone up and the
inaction of refusing to do so. As Cass Sunstein has explained, constitutional "dangers [are]
thought to lie principally in governmental action rather than failure to act." Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,433 (1987). Nowhere is that
more true than in the liberty deprivation context.
250
See Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J.
1237, 1243-50 (2005) (discussing the utility of democratic participation as a guide to
248
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of the liberty deprivation context, it is important to consider how the regulated
entities, generally most able to advocate for themselves through Congress,
would also benefit from the bias toward inaction that robust prosecutorial
discretion provides. In most traditional administrative contexts----e.g., food
safety, environmental regulation, labor protections, and banking regulationsthe interests of the regulated entities are significantly more concentrated than the
interests of the beneficiaries of the regulation. In addition, the regulated entities
in these contexts, which are often powerful business interests, are usually better
situated than the beneficiaries of the regulations to influence the congressional
law-making process and thus to guard against excessively punitive statutory
schemes. In these contexts, the dynamics of agency capture and, even short of
capture, the ability of these types of regulated entities to influence the
prosecuting agencies can operate as an additional effective check against
excessive enforcement. 251 These dynamics support a more limited vision of
prosecutorial discretion authority in traditional administrative realms since we
have little reason to fear overly punitive statutory schemes.
However, precisely the opposite democratic participatory dynamic is at play
in the liberty deprivation context. In the criminal context, troves have been
written about how the political dynamics of criminal law create ever-expanding
criminal codes and increasingly harsh penalties.252 The same dynamics are
almost universally present in other realms where Congress establishes
enforcement schemes that threaten physical liberty. 253 Guantanamo detainees,
Japanese internment victims, sex offenders, undocumented immigrants, and
severely mentally ill individuals are dramatically unlike the entities regulated in
the traditional administrative realms discussed above. These disenfranchised
groups are least able to guard against excessively punitive statutory schemes
through the democratic process. As a result, many commentators have observed
how these realms of federal law, like criminal law, have trended almost
consistently toward harsher enforcement schemes. 254 Thus, insofar as the
concern about excessive prosecutorial discretion relates to the
countermajoritarian potential for the President to undermine the will of
Congress, in the liberty deprivation realm, a countermajoritarian safety valve is

constitutional interpretation); see also Cheh, supra note 17, at 265-66 (discussing the
participatory democratic theory considerations in evaluating prosecutorial discretion power).
251 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17-19 (2010); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz,
Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342-61 (2013).
252 See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 146, at 1662; Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law,
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 759-60
(1999); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
508-09 (2001).
253 See Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law, supra note 16, at 516; Price,
supra note 15, at 746.
254 See, e.g., Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law, supra note 16, at 516
(describing how the development of international law has led to an expansion in the types of
illegal behavior that can result in deportation).
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an important safeguard against excessively punitive statutory schemes targeting
politically disfavored minority groups. Moreover, the same political dynamics
that operate against Congress and lead to the one-way ratchet of ever-harsher
criminal and immigration laws, for example, also operate against the President
directly-significantly reducing the potential for presidential overreach in these
arenas.
In the context of the modern administrative state, vision of the President's
prosecutorial discretion power threatens to seriously upset the constitutional
balance and to create a deregulatory bias that is unsupported by the history, text,
and structure of the Constitution. Concerns about presidential encroachment on
Congress's primary policy-making function have led some to argue that
permitting the President to unilaterally refuse to enforce, or substantially
underenforce, laws based on her own normative judgment about the public
interest could effectively give the President a second unconstitutional veto.
Although this is a legitimate and significant concern, these scholars have failed
to consider the possibility that not all prosecutorial discretion power is created
equal.
In traditional administrative realms, the recent trend toward categorical
prosecutorial discretion policies is ahistorical. Allowing the President to
categorically underenforce in all administrative realms would grant her vast
power to undermine the will of Congress across an enormously broad swath of
subject areas that collectively make up a significant portion of the work of the
federal government. It would further allow powerful regulated entities, fully able
to advocate for themselves through the legislative process, an unnecessary
second bite at the apple to escape regulation.
In contrast, recognizing the President's power to enact categorical
prosecutorial discretion policies only in those realms where physical liberty is at
stake is entirely consistent with historical practice. Throughout the nation's
history, in both the immigration and criminal realms, presidents have repeatedly
enacted such policies, generally without significant controversy. Such power is
consistent both with the Constitution's structural bias against liberty deprivation
and with the way in which prosecutorial discretion power is amplified by the
Pardon Clause when enforcement proceedings seek to vindicate offenses against
the public that do not directly interfere with vested private rights. It is also in the
liberty deprivation realm where the regulated individuals are universally
disfavored groups, least able to advocate for themselves through the legislative
process, and thus where our system most needs an additional check on
congressional power. Moreover, limiting robust prosecutorial discretion
authority to the liberty deprivation context cabins this tool of presidential power
to the context of its historic use and thus significantly limits the potential for
unwarranted presidential encroachment into congressional policy making. 255
The number of arenas where the federal government locks people up, or imposes
some equivalent physical deprivation of liberty, is quite limited. Beyond the

255

See supra notes 37-38, 54-76, 107-12 and accompanying text.
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criminal sphere, immigration detention and deportation are unquestionably the
largest areas implicated.256 While caution should be exercised any time the
President is empowered to undermine the will of Congress, limiting this power
to the liberty deprivation realm is both consistent with historical practice and
sharply circumscribes its reach, as the large majority of federal government's
administrative enforcement apparatus would not be implicated.
III. EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER TO PROTECT LIBERTY

To say that the President's prosecutorial discretion authority is at its zenith in
the liberty deprivation context does not mean that the authority is without limits.
Certain limits are clear and uncontested. The difficult separation of powers
issues are whether, when, and how Congress may circumscribe the heightened
prosecutorial discretion authority of the President. Before turning to this inquiry,
however, it is important to recognize the clear limits on the President's power
that operate separate and apart from any limits Congress may be able to impose.
First, the definitional limits of prosecutorial discretion, which distinguish it
from the repudiated dispensing and suspending powers, are foundational
boundaries of the President's enforcement discretion. 257 Prosecutorial discretion
may only be exercised after an offense has been committ(,d. 258 The President
thus has no power to sanction ex ante any violation of law. 259 Moreover, the
President's enforcement discretion does not include the power to refuse to
enforce congressional mandates that an agency take an action unrelated to
individualized enforcement, for example, to promulgate regulations, spend
appropriated dollars, or implement federal programs. 260 If, for example,
Congress were to pass a law requiring the construction of a wall along the
southern border of the country, the President would be obligated,
notwithstanding his stated policy disagreements with such a project, to build the
wall. Full enforcement is the default rule but the very nature of prosecutorial
discretion is an exception to that default.

256 Other types of noncriminal federal confinement include prisoners of war subject to
military commissions, military internment, and sex offenders and mentally ill individuals
subject to civil commitment.
257 See generally supra notes 21-23.
258 See supra notes 46-52.
259 See supra notes 46-52; see also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896); Charles
D. Berger, The Effect ofPresidential Pardons on Disclosure ofInformation: Is Our Cynicism
Justified?, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 163, 172 (1999); Duker, supra note 52, at 526; Hoffstadt, supra
note 197, at 571 n.37.
260 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007) (explaining that the word
"judgment" in the Clean Air Act is "not a roving license [for the EPA] to ignore the statutory
text ... but a direction to exercise discretion within defined statutory limits"); Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610-13 (1838) (noting that construing the
obligation "imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, [to] impl[y] a power
to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely
inadmissible").
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Prosecutorial discretion is limited to those circumstances where Congress has
enacted a statutory scheme that regulates private conduct and proscribes
penalties for misconduct that can only be triggered by executive prosecution.
The distinction was explained by the D.C. Circuit in In re Aiken County2 61 :
As a general matter, there is widespread confusion about the differences
between (i) the President's authority to disregard statutory mandates or
prohibitions on the Executive, based on the President's constitutional
objections, and (ii) the President's prosecutorial discretion not to initiate
charges against (or to pardon) violators ofa federal law. There are two key
practical differences. [T]he President may disregard a statutory mandate or
prohibition on the Executive only on constitutional grounds, not on policy
grounds. By contrast, the President may exercise the prosecutorial
discretion and pardon powers on any ground .... 262
Thus, outside the context of enforcement proceedings, Congress may direct
agency action and prosecutorial discretion principles impose no obstacle to such
direction. This does not mean that Congress's general power to direct agency
action can be used as a Trojan horse to limit the constitutionally protected
prosecutorial powers of the President. To the extent that Congress cannot not
directly limit the President's discretion over agency enforcement actions, 263
neither could it do so indirectly through appropriations or otherwise.264 ·
Second, the President remains accountable to, and limited by, the will of the
electorate. Some may discount the potency of this check on presidential power,
especially during a second term in office. However, public support or hostility
toward presidential action always remains a primary consideration insofar as the
President's power vis-a-vis Congress is often a function of her public support.
Moreover, the President at all times remains conscious of her role as the leader
of her political party and acutely attuned to how her policies will impact the
electoral fate of her party. In addition, the undivided concentration of the
prosecutorial discretion power in the President serves to increase accountability
to the electorate. 265 This is particularly true in the arenas where liberty
deprivation is at stake-e.g., criminal, immigration, and military internmentsince prosecutorial discretion in these contexts benefits widely disfavored
classes. Thus, in the liberty deprivation context in particular, as Hamilton
explained, the "dread of being accused of weakness or connivance" is a powerful
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725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 265 n.10.
263
See infra Section III.B.
264
See McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329,369 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[I]fCongress were
to subject the Executive's exercise of its core prosecutorial discretion to review by the courts,
or, even more dramatically, to condition a significant level of funding on the exercise of the
Executive's pardon or appointment powers in a particular manner, legitimate questions as to
the effect of those limitations on the independence of the Executive could be raised."); infra
Section III.B.
262
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·

THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 28, at 447.
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limit on the President's broad assertion of her power. 266 Accordingly,
democratic accountability is a significant check on the President's prosecutorial
discretion power, particularly in high-profile ambitious assertions of such
power.
Finally, while the Constitution bestows on the President her prosecutorial
discretion power, it also unquestionably limits that power. 267 Equal protection
values require that prosecutorial discretion policies cannot be motivated by an
improper discriminatory purpose. 268 Nor does the Constitution permit the
President to exercise prosecutorial discretion with a retaliatory purpose or with
the intent to punish individuals for exercising their First Amendment or other
constitutional rights. 269 Similarly, an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
triggered by bribery or other corrupt motives would offend due process norms. 270
Thus, while the Constitution bestows extremely broad prosecutorial discretion
authority on the President, it also imposes some clear outer limits to the exercise
of that discretion.
These principles limit the operation of prosecutorial discretion power in all
contexts. However, in determining how that power may be limited by Congress,
context matters. Pursuant to the familiar Youngstown framework, presidential
power is generally a function of the extent to which Congress has authorized,
remained silent, or disapproved of presidential action. 271 However, there are
certain realms where Congress may not, or has only a limited ability to, intrude
on the power of the President.272 Insofar as the President's prosecutorial

266
267

Id at 448. .

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (noting that though prosecutorial
discretion is broad, there are "undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise"); cf
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (holding that even actions generally precluded
from judicial review can be reviewable if they raise a constitutional question).
268 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 630 (1985); Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union,
Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499, 1510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane) (holding that the court
could review policies for abuse of discretion where there is reason to believe a decision was
motivated by discriminatory racial or religious animus); Wadhia, supra note 1, at 287 (noting
that the Court has recognized an exception to the general presumption against reviewability
in cases where it is alleged that an agency is engaging in selective enforcement on the basis
ofrace). But cf Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999)
(holding that an "alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective
enforcement as a defense against his deportation").
269 Heckler v. Chaney, 4 70 U.S. 821, 846 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that the
Court has previously "held that certain potentially vindictive exercises of prosecutorial
discretion were both reviewable and impermissible"); Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 30
(1984) (observing that the Court had previously established a presumption of vindictiveness
where a prosecutor sought a felony indictment only after a defendant exercised his statutory
right to a trial de novo).
270 United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978).
271 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
272 See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding
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discretion authority is at its height in the liberty deprivation context, it follows
that Congress's power is at its lowest ebb when it attempts to limit the
President's authority to protect liberty. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
identify the exact boundaries of presidential and congressional authority here.
Below, I attempt to consider the areas where Congress may assert some control
over prosecutorial discretion in the liberty deprivation context and to draw into
focus those areas where congressional power may be uniquely limited.
A. Indirect Mechanisms of Congressional Control
There are certain indirect mechanisms that Congress can unquestionably
utilize to exert control over prosecutorial discretion policies in any realm.
Congress has oversight authority of all federal agencies and can engage in fact
finding, hold public hearings, and call agency heads to account for controversial
policies. Moreover, even when Congress lacks the authority to directly alter
prosecutorial discretion policies, it has a myriad of tools to assert collateral
political pressure on the Executive to express its disapproval.2 73 For example, it
can withhold appropriations, refuse to confirm executive nominees, conduct
investigations, withhold action on collateral legislation of import to the
President, or refuse to act on legislation essential to the operation of the
government. Depending on the depth of Congress's disapproval and the depth
of the President's commitment to her prosecutorial discretion policies, these
collateral levers could be significant mechanisms of control.
B. Direct Mechanisms of Congressional Control
The most challenging constitutional issue is when and how Congress can
directly assert control over a president's enforcement discretion. Congress can
unquestionably always ratchet down enforcement, either by deregulating
prohibited conduct, reducing proscribed statutory penalties, reducing or
eliminating appropriations for certain types of enforcement actions, or in
extreme cases, by granting legislative amnesties. The hard question is when, if
ever, Congress can restrict the prosecutorial discretion policies of a Presidenteither by establishing enforcement priorities or by directly mandating a certain
level of enforcement.
Courts have, in a handful of cases, suggested that Congress can directly limit
an administrative agency's enforcement discretion. In Heckler, the Supreme
Court opined that "Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement
that the President has exclusive power to recognize foreign nations and Congress may not
intrude on that power); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (holding that the pardon
power "cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress").
273 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2701, 2704-05 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the "innumerable ways" Congress can exert indirect political pressure on the
President); Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012) (same);
Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War over
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 671-72 (1992) (same); Richman, supra note 252,
at 759 (same).
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power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise
circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will
pursue."274 In Dunlop v. Bachowski, 275 an unsuccessful candidate for labor union
office sued challenging the Secretary of Labor's decision not to bring a civil
action to set aside a union election. 276 The Court held that review of the
Secretary's decision not to file suit was justiciable and that Congress had
permissibly limited the agency's prosecutorial discretion authority by mandating
that an action be initiated if the Secretary finds probable cause of a violation that
likely impact the outcome of the union election.277 Similarly, in Cook v. FDA, 278
the D.C. Circuit interpreted a statute to entirely deprive the FDA of discretion to
decline to initiate enforcement actions regarding the importation of certain
restricted drugs. 279 Notably all of these cases arose in traditional administrative
realms where the enforcement proceedings would not result in the deprivation
of physical liberty.
Two things are clear from the case law and scholarship. First, there is
widespread agreement that Congress may sometimes directly limit the scope of
the Executive's prosecutorial discretion authority. 280 Second, there is
widespread agreement that some congressional limits would impermissibly
intrude on the President's prosecutorial discretion authority. 281 Nothing in the
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Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833.
421 U.S. 560 (1975).
276 Id. at 562-63.
277
Id. at 566-68.
278
733 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
279 Id. at 7-10.
280
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 833 (1985); Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 566-68; Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The
President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2295 (2006); Love & Garg, supra note
21, at 1236; Price, supra note 15, at 707; Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits ofExecutive Power,
59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 316 (2009).
281
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,484
(2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266-67
(1974); McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 369 (4th Cir. 2004); Price, supra note 15,
at 707. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the OLC has been particularly protective of the President's
nondefeasible enforcement discretion. See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick Philbin, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Office
of
Legislative
Affairs
(Apr.
8,
2002),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/03/09/memojusticeauthorization
act0482002.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZA9-BCAY] ("Particularly where the Constitution
expressly assigns a duty to the Executive, the Supreme Court has recognized grave
constitutional flaws with attempts by Congress to effect encroachments upon subjects within
the Executive's control."); Congress Requests for Info. from Inspectors Gen. Concerning
Open Criminal Investigations, 13 Op. O.L.C. 77, 79 (1989) ("[N]either the judicial nor
legislative branches may directly interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of the executive
branch by directing it to prosecute particular individuals."); Subpoenas of Dep't of Justice
Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 252,264 (1984) ("The Executive therefore has the exclusive
275
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case law or scholarship, however, provides adequate guidance regarding the line
between these two generally accepted principles. The division between
traditional administrative enforcement proceedings and enforcement
proceedings that implicate physical liberty can fill this void and appropriately
balance the critical separation of powers considerations.
In the traditional administrative realms, Congress should enjoy greater power
to dictate the terms of executive enforcement via statute. Indeed, there are
examples of statutory schemes that mandate enforcement in all cases where a
violation is found. 282 It is hard to imagine, for example, that Congress could not
mandate enforcement action necessary to remedy unsafe conditions discovered
at a nuclear power plant. Identifying the precise boundaries of congressional
power to limit enforcement discretion in traditional administrative realms is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, whatever those boundaries may be,
it seems clear that Congress cannot aggrandize its own power by granting
executive discretion to actors under congressional control.283 Categorical
prosecutorial discretion policy in these traditional administrative realms,
particularly when motivated by policy disagreements with Congress, would be
the most difficult to justify.284
In the context of criminal enforcement and the limited administrative arenas
that can result in the deprivation of an individual's physical liberty, Congress's
power should be significantly more limited. Here Congress should not be
permitted to encroach on the Executive's constitutional enforcement discretion
by imposing an enforcement quota mandating a particular level of

authority to enforce the laws adopted by Congress, and neither the Judicial nor Legislative
Branches may directly interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of the Executive by directing
the Executive to prosecute particular individuals.").
282
See, e.g., Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 560; Cook, 733 F.3d at 10 (holding that 21 U.S.C.
§ 381(a) requires the FDA to refuse admission ofa drug where it finds a violation of the act).
283 . See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 136-37 ("Not having the power of appointment, unless
expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties
upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by
indirection ...." (quoting Springerv. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189,202 (1928))); see also
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508 ("The only issue in this case is whether Congress may
deprive the President of adequate control over the Board, which is the regulator of first resort
and the primary law enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy. We hold that it
cannot.").
284 In contrast, executive agencies must always be free to make prosecutorial discretion
determinations based on resource allocation considerations. However, it can at times be
difficult to distinguish pure resource allocation justifications from justifications based on
normative considerations tied to mercy or societal utility. A decision, in the face of limited
resources, to prioritize one type of labor violation over another because the Executive deems
one more serious can be framed as a resource allocation decision. But the Executive has no
special expertise in determining the seriousness of one offense versus the other. True resource
allocation policies are based on considerations where the Executive holds some superior
institutional expertise such as assessing the cost of certain types of prosecution or the
likelihood of success.

2017]

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AT ITS ZENITH

543

enforcement. 285 Neither should Congress be permitted to proscribe the
President's authority by dictating the factors that must be considered when the
President exercises her enforcement discretion. 286 This is relatively
uncontroversial in the criminal realm where courts have recognized that
Congress may not limit prosecutorial discretion authority. 287 The same
considerations that drive nondefeasible prosecutorial discretion authority in
criminal proceedings----consistent historical practice, the Constitution's
structural bias against liberty deprivation, the enhanced power emanating from
the Pardon Clause for offenses against the state, and the participatory democratic
theory dynamics-apply with equal force to other liberty deprivation realms. 288
Permitting Congress to dictate the terms of the President's prosecutorial

285

Interestingly, unlike in traditional administrative realms, Congress has almost
universally refrained from enacting statutes that purport to limit executive enforcement
discretion in the liberty deprivation realm. One prominent counter example is a provision that
Congress has included in appropriations bills in recent years, which was originally understood
to require that immigration authorities maintain custody of a certain number of immigrants
on any given day. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat.
5, 251 (2013) (requiring that the immigration agency maintain not "[fewer] than 34,000
detention beds"). This appears to be the sort of enforcement quota that I maintain is
impermissible in the liberty deprivation realm. However, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh
Johnson, who oversaw the immigration agency, has rejected this interpretation. See Jessica
Vaughan, DHS Sec. Johnson Disputes Detention Bed Mandate, CTR. FORlMMIGR. Srun. (Mar.
14,
2014),
http://cis.org/vaughan/dhs-sec-johnson-disputes-detention-bed-mandate
[https://perma.cc/RL4R-MXXK]. He maintains that Congress cannot dictate a certain level of
enforcement, and that the appropriation language only means that he must have 34,000 beds
available on any given day. Id. Because the agency has adopted this view of the purported
"bed quota," its daily detained population of immigrant detainees has fallen significantly
below the 34,000 beds described in the appropriations language. Joanne Faryon, U.S.
Government Holding Fewer Immigrants in Detention, KPBS (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2015/apr/06/us-government-holding-fewer-immigrants-detention
[https://perma.cc/WW6W-YZJL] (reporting on data showing that the average daily immigrant
detainee population for the first five months of fiscal year 2015 was 26,374).
286 The OLC, in a memorandum issued on the same day President Obama announced his
DAPA program, at least partially endorsed the idea that congressional priorities can act as a
limiting principle on the President's prosecutorial discretion power. OLC Opinion, supra note
11, at 6 (noting Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power by setting
substantive priorities). But see Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 16, at 148-59
(convincingly demonstrating the unworkability of this proposed limiting principle); Wadhia,
supra note 1, at 246 ("Neither the immigration statute nor the regulations contain eligibility
criteria for seeking a favorable grant ofprosecutorial discretion.").
287 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
288 Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.8, 953 n.17 (1983) (reserving the question of
whether Congress "retain[ed] the power ... to enact a law, in accordance with the
requirements of Art. I of the Constitution, mandating a particular alien's deportation,"
explaining that "other constitutional principles [may] place substantive limitations on such
action," and noting then-Attorney General Jackson's characterization of such a law as "an
historical departure from an unbroken American practice and tradition").
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discretion in this realm would be inconsistent with the constitutional scheme,
requiring consensus of the three branches of government to deprive an individual
of physical liberty. It would likewise undermine the role the President can play
in chec~ing against overly punitive statutory schemes targeting disfavored
groups. In these realms, therefore, where physical liberty is at stake, the
President should be permitted to enact categorical prosecutorial discretion
policies.
C. Evaluating Modern Prosecutorial Discretion Practices
Using this proposed framework, I return to the practices of modern presidents
and their increasing use of broad policy-driven prosecutorial discretion policies.
When the Bush Administration issued its policy directing that the EPA should
categorically refrain from initiating enforcement proceedings against certain
coal-fired power plants, it did so presumably based on its judgment that the
economic impact of regulatory violations at issue did more harm to the public
interest than the environmental benefits that could be reaped through
enforcement. 289 This was, however, in direct conflict with the judgment of
Congress in enacting the statutory scheme. Thus, insofar as physical liberty
deprivation was not at stake, it is difficult to justify the President using his
enforcement discretion to supplant the judgment of Congress. A similar analysis
applies to President Bush's apparent categorical nonenforcement policies in the
labor, food safety, securities regulation, and civil rights realms, though because
these policies were not memorialized in public memorandum it is more difficult
to conclusively evaluate them. 290
President Obama's determination to categorically refrain from enforcing
certain requirements regarding noncompliant insurance plans under the ACA for
a period during which Congress had mandated enforcement presents a slightly
more difficult case. One could argue that the President's categorical
nonenforcement policy here was driven by his judgment that the congressional
timeline was unworkable and would thus undermine effective implementation
of the law that Congress designed. Insofar as the President's policy was aligned
with congressional objectives, this would militate in favor of a permissible
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. However, two factors cut significantly in
the other direction. First, there was no ambiguity in the statutory scheme
regarding the timeline for implementation. The relevant implementation date
was deliberate, staged, and plain on the face of the statute. Thus, Congress had
made clear its considered judgment regarding the workable timeline for
implementation. Second, there is ample evidence to suggest that the President
was motivated less by a desire to protect against undermining the statutory
scheme and more by his political desire to adhere to prior representations that
he had made about people's ability to maintain health insurance policies they
liked. This would not have been true ifhe adhered to the congressional timeline.

289
290

See supra note 62 and accompany text.
See supra note 74 and accompany text.
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Thus, here too, I propose that the President exceeded his discretion in enacting
the categorical nonenforcement policy.291
President Obama's nonenforcement guidelines related to marijuana offenses
in states that have legalized various aspects of marijuana use and sale present
the clearest case of appropriate categorical discretion. Insofar as the guidelines
fall within the criminal realms and the President unquestionably has the power
to pardon all such offenses, so too could the President grant amnesty from
prosecution. President Clinton's "Corporate Leniency Policy," which protected
corporations, as well as their directors, officers, and employees, from antitrust
prosecutions under certain circumstances, was also within the President's power.
Insofar as the policy relates to nonenforcement of criminal laws, it again falls
easily within the President's power. 292
Finally, I tum to an analysis of the DACA and DAPA programs. There is
significant debate regarding whether or not the DACA and DAP A programs are
consistent with the statutory scheme and whether the programs can be justified
as part of an enforcement prioritization program that, regardless of any
heightened powers, is within the authority of the agency to efficiently allocate
limited enforcement resources. In regard to the prioritization issue, recall that
current appropriations support the deportation of a maximum of a few hundred
thousand individuals each year; but there are approximately twenty-five million
individuals who could potentially face deportation proceedings. 293 Insofar as
DACA and DAP A are available to nonpriority immigrants only, the Obama
Administration has justified the programs, in part, based on the need to remove
some of the haystack to find the needles that are its enforcement priorities.294
This, however, begs the question, in the first instance, of whether its enforcement
priorities are consistent with the statutory scheme.
The OLC explicitly justified the programs as consistent with the statutory
scheme, explaining that the beneficiaries are individuals who could eventually
gain status through the statute, though sometimes not for decades. 295 Opponents
have asserted that the programs are in direct conflict with the statute and, in fact,
it was the President's inability to secure passage of the DREAM Act and
comprehensive immigration reform through Congress that led him to attempt to

291
See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act,
164 U. PAL. REV. 1715, 1722-25 (2016).
292 The issue of corporate criminal prosecution raises an interesting issue insofar as
corporations, even in the criminal context, can never face a deprivation of physical liberty.
Query whether criminal proceedings that do not result in a deprivation of liberty should
suggest a narrower vision of prosecutorial discretion authority. Certainly some of the
democratic participatory theory dynamics would play out differently in the corporate context.
However, ultimately this is a narrow issue and one controlled by Supreme Court precedent
declaring the Executive's absolute discretion in the criminal context. See supra notes 65-66
and accompany text.
293 See supra notes 89-95 and accompany text.
294 See OLC Opinion, supra note 11, at 25.
295 Id. at 31.
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undermine the statutory scheme. 296 It is first important to note that the failures
of Congress to pass the DREAM Act and comprehensive immigration reform
are not relevant to the analysis of the values and priorities underlying the
previously enacted Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Perhaps more
importantly, however, Adam Cox and Christina Rodriguez have recently, and
convincingly, critiqued the analysis of the OLC, not because they see a conflict
between the programs and the INA but because they have demonstrated that
there is no way to reasonably discern the congressional priorities that underlie
the Act, which is the product of decades of revisions and rewrites by multiple
congresses with many different motivations. 297
Ultimately, under the framework I propose, however, adherence to statutory
priorities is only potentially dispositive if physical liberty is not at stake. Thus,
the threshold question is whether the deportation proceedings implicate a
potential physical liberty deprivation. I answer that question in the affirmative
for three reasons. First, while not all individuals facing deportation are detained,
the physical act of deportation-of being banished from the United States-is a
physical liberty deprivation, restricting one's physical freedom of movement in
a manner on par with physical incarceration. The Supreme Court has
characterized the liberty deprivation related to deportation in the gravest of
terms, suggesting that it is akin to the "loss of all that makes life worth living"
and that it is often more significant than the consequences of incarceration. 298
Indeed, the historic precursors to deportation, first banishment and later the
English practice of "transportation" to the colonies, were among the most severe
consequences imposed on individuals convicted of crimes. 299 Deportation is, in
many circumstances, increasingly recognized as a form of quasi-criminal

296

Randy Bomtrager, GOP: President Obama 's Out To Destroy Our Nation Through His
Executive Actions on Immigration, HUFFINGTON POST (May 19, 2015, 11:37 AM),
http"://www.huffingtonpost.com/randy-bomtrager/gop-president-obamas-out-to-destroy-ournation_ b_ 7314252.html [https://perma.cc/J297-VF5C].
297 Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 16, at 151 ("The congressional priorities approach
fails because those priorities are a mirage.").
298 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,361 (2010)(noting that the ImmigrationActof1917
brought "'radical changes' to our law" because, for the first time, "Congress made classes of
noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American soil"); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) ("[A]lthough deportation technically is not criminal punishment, it
may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right to pursue a vocation
or a calling." (citations omitted)); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U$. 276, 284 (1922)
("[Deportation] may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth
living.").
299 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709, 736-41 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) ("Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, and family, and
friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment,
and that oftentimes most severe and cruel."); Markowitz, supra note 216, 323-24 (noting
transportation was "the only 'significant form of punishment short of death utilized during"
the eighteenth century).
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punishment. 300 Second, while not every (or even most) criminal proceedings
result in a sentence of incarceration, it is the potential for incarceration that
triggers the Executive's heightened prosecutorial discretion. The same is true in
deportation proceedings. While hundreds of thousands of immigrants facing
deportation are detained each year, many are not. 301 However, like criminal
defendants, all immigrants facing deportation face the potential of detention. 302
Third, in considering the availability of habeas corpus review for deportation
proceedings, the Supreme Court has held that deportation proceedings
categorically satisfy the custody requirement of the great writ. 303 Thus, I place
deportation proceedings in the category of proceedings that implicate physical
liberty deprivations.
Therefore, I conclude that the President is within his powers to enact broad
categorical prosecutorial discretion policies regarding deportation proceedings.
Two issues remain to consider whether the DACA and DAPA programs fall
within the definitional limits of prosecutorial discretion rather than the
repudiated dispensing and suspending powers. First, DACA and DAPA carry
with them not only a decision to forego deportation proceedings but also an
affirmative grant of work authorization. No vision of prosecutorial discretion
authority can justify the affirmative grant of a statutorily prohibited benefit. Yet
this issue is ultimately a red herring, because far from being prohibited, work
authorization is affirmatively authorized for these individuals under the statute
enacted by Congress.304 Thus, the benefit of work authorization flows from the
statute, and from Congress, and not from the President's enforcement discretion.
The second and more difficult issue is whether DACA and DAPA are truly
retrospective only or whether they could be viewed as impermissibly authorizing
future violations of law. On their face, the programs are clearly retrospective.
Only individuals who are without legal status and who have been in the country
300

Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1314 (2011)
("While the Court ... continues to utilize the civil label to describe deportation proceedings,
increasingly that label is in tension with the application of criminal, or quasi-criminal, doctrine
in deportation proceedings.").
301 John F. Simanski, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2013, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND
SECURITY
ANN.
REP.,
(Sept.
2014),
at
1,
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4F9-52XC] (noting ICE detained nearly 441,000 aliens during 2013).
302 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012) ("On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.").
303 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001).
304 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(3), 1324a(h)(3) ("[T]he term 'unauthorized alien' means, with
respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that
time ... authorized to be so employed by this Act or by the Attorney General."); 8 C.F.R. §
274a.12(c)(14) (2016) (declaring that any "alien who has been granted deferred action, an act
of administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority, if
the alien establishes an economic necessity for employment" must apply for work
authorization); supra notes 126 and accompanying text.
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for five years prior to the announcement of the program are eligible. 305 Thus the
program can in no way be viewed as prior authorization for individuals to
illegally enter the United States. However, the program allows for the issuance
of deferred action for three years. Insofar as that states an intention not to initiate
deportation proceeding based upon some past act-the illegal entry into the
United States, for example-this would be squarely within the President's
prosecutorial discretion authority. The memorandum makes clear, however, as
it must, that a grant of deferred action confers no legal immigration status.
Certain provisions of the INA make mere presence without legal immigration
status a violation. 306 If the three-year grant of deferred action is understood to
authorize a future and continuing violation of the INA, 307 the grant would fall
beyond the prosecutorial discretion authority of the President.
However, the DAPA memorandum also makes clear that it confers no rights
to protection from future prosecution.308 Nothing prevents the President from
revoking a grant of deferred action at any time and initiating deportation
proceedings. Indeed, fear that the next President would not honor the grant of
deferred action created significant anxiety in the immigrant community and
deterred some from applying for the program. The practice of granting deferred
action for fixed periods of time is a longstanding practice acknowledged without
challenge by the Supreme Court. 309 The three-year grant of deferred action
contemplated under the DACA and DAPA programs is best understood, not as
a license for future unlawful conduct, but as a matter of administrative
convenience and diligence, ensuring that the decision will be periodically
revisited. Thus insofar as the President's DACA and DAPA programs implicate
potential deprivations of physical liberty and do not authorize future illegality,
and insofar as the affirmative benefit work authorization is grounded in the
statute, the programs appear within the President's constitutional authority. 310
305

DAPA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 4.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B) ("Any alien who is present in the United States in violation
of this Chapter or any other law of the United States, or whose nonimmigrant visa ... has
been revoked under section 120l(i) of this title is deportable.").
307
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(characterizing immigration violations as "an ongoing violation of United States law").
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CONCLUSION

When a law sweeps too broadly and bristles with harshness against a
significant sector of the American public, the first and best response is legislative
reform. However, when the impacted sector of the public is politically
disfavored, and when legislators fear a political price for participating in reform,
our legislative process is often unable to react to the crisis. This is a danger
inherent in the democratic process. The solution to this dilemma is not, as a
general matter, to empower the President to substitute her own vision of sound
public policy for that of Congress. Such a cure would be worse than the disease.
However, in the limited arenas where the congressional scheme results in the
physical deprivation ofliberty, the balance of potential harms and benefits shifts.
Our nation's history is checkered with instances where the federal
government has, in heated political moments, punitively deprived disfavored
minorities of their physical liberty. In these instances, Congress was unable to
evenhandedly assess the public interest. The same political dynamics that
paralyze or inflame Congress often also act against the President and, thus,
empowering the President to act is no guarantee that such episodes can be
avoided. However, working alongside the Constitution's individual rights
framework, robust presidential prosecutorial discretion authority in the liberty
deprivation context can provide another important constitutional tool to protect
disfavored groups from unjust applications of the most coercive power of the
federal government. Cabining heightened prosecutorial discretion authority in
this way can provide a workable constitutional limiting principle, consistent with
both historical practice and the structure of the Constitution.

